Washington University in St. Louis

Washington University Open Scholarship
Arts & Sciences Electronic Theses and
Dissertations

Arts & Sciences

Spring 5-15-2022

Development and Deference to Legal Doctrine at the US Supreme
Court
Jbrandon Duck-Mayr
Washington University in St. Louis

Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/art_sci_etds
Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Duck-Mayr, Jbrandon, "Development and Deference to Legal Doctrine at the US Supreme Court" (2022).
Arts & Sciences Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 2639.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/art_sci_etds/2639

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Arts & Sciences at Washington University Open
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Arts & Sciences Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact
digital@wumail.wustl.edu.

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS
Department of Political Science

Dissertation Examination Comittee:
James F. Spriggs II, Chair
Scott Baker
Randall Calvert
Lee Epstein
Keith Schnakenberg

Development and Deference to Legal Doctrine at the US Supreme Court
by
JBrandon Duck-Mayr

A dissertation presented to
The Graduate School
of Washington University in
partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy

May 2022
St. Louis, Missouri

© 2022 JBrandon Duck-Mayr

Table of Contents
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

iv

List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

v

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

vi

Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2

Explaining Legal Inconsistency . . . . . . . . .
2.1 Causes and Consequences of Inconsistency
2.2 Rule Making on Collegial Courts . . . . . .
2.3 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.4 Inconsistency from Multi-step Reasoning .
2.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

4
8
11
12
16
22

3

Inference in Gaussian Process Models for Political Science .
3.1 A Primer on GP Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2 GP Models in Political Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.3 Tools for Inference in GP Models . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.4 Application: Economic Voting in Presidential Elections .
3.5 Benefits of GP Models for the Study of Judicial Politics .
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

26
27
33
34
43
49
51

4

The Force of the Law: The Constraining Effect of Precedent at the US Supreme Court
4.1 Measuring the Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.2 Modeling Judges’ Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3 Data and Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3.2 Gaussian process classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3.3 Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3.4 Model specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ii

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

1

52
56
58
64
64
65
68
71
72

4.5
5

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
A Appendix to Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
A.1 Formal Results and Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
A.2 Deference to Trial Court Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
B Appendix to Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B.1 Derivation of posterior over β in GP regression .
B.2 Distribution of derivatives of Gaussian processes
B.2.1 The regression case . . . . . . . . . . . .
B.2.2 The classification case . . . . . . . . . .
B.3 Distribution of average marginal effects . . . . .
B.4 Derivatives of mean and covariance functions . .

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

100
100
103
105
106
107
110

C Appendix to Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C.1 Full results of main model . . . . . . . . .
C.2 Marginal effect of law for additional justices
C.3 Robustness check: In-group bias . . . . . .

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

111
111
114
117

iii

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

List of Figures
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4

An example individual rule and ICR for Fourth Amendment police seizure cases.
Assigning outcomes by translating a fact space to a doctrine space. . . . . . . . .
An example of an inconsistent doctrine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
An example of an inconsistent doctrine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.

13
15
24
25

3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7

.
.
.
.
.
.

31
32
43
45
46
47

3.8

An example GP prior and posterior for regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
An example GP prior and posterior for binary classification . . . . . . . . . . . .
Average marginal effect (AME) of x . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Comparing GET first differences between GP classification and logit . . . . . . .
Marginal effect of the GET index across its observed range . . . . . . . . . . . .
Comparing predicted probabilities between GP classification and logit . . . . . .
Marginal effect of the GET index across its observed range when incumbency is
controlled for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Comparing estimation of legal rules between linear models and GP classification.

4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7

Comparing estimation of legal rules between linear models and GP classification.
Directed acyclic graph for the influence on a justice’s decisions. . . . . . . . . .
Average marginal effect of λ on judges’ decisions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Comparing predicted outcomes for Justice Ginsburg against λ. . . . . . . . . . .
Proportion of outcomes changed by a shock to λ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Average marginal effect of λ by category. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Effect of λ by absolute value of λ for each justice. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

. 48
. 50
67
69
75
78
79
81
82

C.1 Comparing predicted outcomes for each justice against λ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

iv

List of Tables
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4

Notation Used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Doctrines and fact-finding functions for the judges on the collegial court.
Example cases showing inconsistency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Further example cases showing inconsistency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4.1
4.2

Average marginal effect of λ on judges’ decisions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Number of observations in each category for each justice. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

C.1
C.2
C.3
C.4

Average marginal effects for all predictors in the justice-level models.
Number of complete observations for each justice. . . . . . . . . . . .
Average marginal effect of λ on judges’ decisions. . . . . . . . . . . .
Average marginal effect of λ on judges’ decisions. . . . . . . . . . . .

v

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

16
19
20
21

112
115
116
118

Acknowledgments
There are many people whose aid and assistance I would like to acknowledge. First and
foremost, I want to say a special thanks to my loving partner Sarah Duck-Mayr, without whom I
would surely have lost the will to complete this work long ago. I also want to thank my advisor,
Jim Spriggs, for his endless patience and exceptional mentorship, and the other members of my
dissertation committee, Randall Calvert, Lee Epstein, Keith Schnakenberg, and Scott Baker, for
their incredibly helpful comments and advice. A number of other faculty at Washington University
in St. Louis deserve special mention as well, including Jacob Montgomery, who is well-known in
the department for his generosity with his time and willingness to collaborate with students, and
Matt Gabel, whose support and uncanny insight was invaluable. Additionally, I want to thank the
amazing staff for the Department of Political Science, particularly Colleen Skaggs and Heather
Sloan-Randick, without whom I could not have navigated my time at Washington University in
St. Louis. Finally, I want to acknowledge the assistance I received during my last year from the
COVID Research Disruption Extension (CORDE) program. The novel coronavirus disrupted all
our lives, and made it impossible to complete my research on my original time table; the university’s
aid through this program was crucial to the completion of my research.
JBrandon Duck-Mayr
Washington University in St. Louis
May 2022

vi

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Development and Deference to Legal Doctrine at the US Supreme Court
by
JBrandon Duck-Mayr
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
Washington University in St. Louis, 2022
James F. Spriggs II, Chair

How do judicial institutions and the choices judges make affect how the law develops? And how
does existing law in turn affect judges’ decisions? In this dissertation, I address important aspects
of both of these fundamental questions of judicial politics. First I explore why courts create
inconsistent legal doctrine. Because judges cannot describe how the rules they craft will apply to
every conceivable factual variation in cases, they must describe them more abstractly. I use a social
choice theoretic model to show that absent unrealistic restrictions on judges’ preferences, decision
making on collegial courts in this context can result in inconsistent doctrine. I then examine the
constraining effect of law at the US Supreme Court. I generate a measure of the legal status quo,
or the outcome implied in cases heard by the Court from its past precedents. I show how to control
for the justices’ own contributions to the legal status quo to identify the law’s constraining effect,
and find it exerts a statistically reliable constraining effect on the decisions of a supermajority of
Supreme Court justices. The methodology for this study required extending a class of models from
the machine learning literature, Gaussian process models, which I also devote a chapter to.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
What can we say about the legal policy judges will make as they craft law? How does existing
law affect judges’ decisions? These questions are fundamental to the study of judicial politics.
In this dissertation, I tackle important aspects of both of these questions, examining why judges
generate inconsistent legal doctrine, and whether and how much existing precedent constrains the
choices of US Supreme Court justices. This research advances not only our understanding of legal
inconsistency and legal constraint at the US Supreme Court, but I also generate a new measure of
the “legal status quo”—an important concept in the judicial politics literature more broadly—and
advance the state of the art for a class of flexible machine learning models (Gaussian process
models) that are useful for the social sciences.
In Chapter 2, “Explaining Legal Inconsistency”, I use a social choice theoretic model to show
one reason why inconsistent legal doctrine develops. Kornhauser (1992) highlights a difficulty
in judgement aggregation on collegial (i.e. multi-member) courts when the legal rule dictating
how intermediate legal conclusions (such as whether parties to a case have formed a contract)
are related to ultimate case outcomes is fixed, and Landa and Lax (2009) highlights a similar
difficulty when intermediate legal conclusions are fixed but judges’ preferences over legal rules are
aggregated. However, judges often engage in a sort of multi-step reasoning, where they determine
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both the intermediate legal conclusions using the specific facts of cases and how those intermediate
conclusions determine the ultimate outcome of the case. I prove that only very strict (and in the
context of judicial decision making, typically unreasonable) assumptions on preferences can ensure
multi-step judgment aggregation on collegial bodies such as multi-member courts does not result
in inconsistency.
In Chapter 4, “The Force of the Law: The Constraining Effect of Precedent at the US Supreme
Court”, I assess whether existing law constrains Supreme Court justices’ decisions in the cases
before them. Prior literature lacks a convincing answer to this question, instead offering mixed
findings, with studies such as Bartels (2009) and Bailey and Maltzman (2011) finding some evidence
of a constraining effect of law while others such as Segal and Spaeth (1996) and Segal and Spaeth
(2002) find little evidence of such an effect. I argue the literature’s mixed findings are due to
conceptual shortcomings and methodological issues: While a number of clever approaches have
been taken to operationalize the law in statistical models of judges’ decisions, so far we lack a
measure of the legal status quo, or the outcome implied in the current case by the Court’s past
cases. Moreover, a difficult obstacle to inference in this context is the problem of state dependence;
since a justice’s vote on a case today impacts what the law is tomorrow, correlation between the legal
status quo and a justice’s votes could simply be measuring their tendency to agree with their own
past selves. I demonstrate how to address both of these issues using Gaussian process classification,
a model from the machine learning literature. Using this approach, I find the legal status quo has
a statistically reliable and substantively meaningful effect on the decisions of a supermajority of
Supreme Court justices.
In addition to providing the most reliable evidence to date on the law’s constraining effect at the
Court, the measure of the legal status quo developed in Chapter 4 is an important contribution to
the study of judicial politics. Explicitly or implicitly, the legal status quo plays a key role in much of
the judicial politics literature (e.g. Martin and Quinn 2002; Black and Owens 2009). Some studies
try to capture the legal status quo of a case at the Supreme Court by coding the lower court ruling as
2

liberal or conservative, which makes sense if we want to focus on the Supreme Court as a manager
that wants to correct specific errors of its subordinate courts. However, if we think Supreme Court
justices care more about the overall state of the law, my new measure better captures the legal status
quo. Further, since I show in Chapter 4 how to control for the information about individual justices’
preferences that have leaked into this status quo measure, I help solve a long-standing and serious
danger to inference in studies of legal constraint.
To conduct the analysis in Chapter 4, I had to advance the state of the art in Gaussian process
(GP) models, a method which is also quite new to the political science literature, so in Chapter 3,
“Inference in Gaussian Process Models for Political Science”, I introduce the method and derive
inferential quantities of interest to social scientists for Gaussian process models. As this family of
models hails from the machine learning literature, almost all inference for these models previously
developed related to prediction, whereas social scientists are typically more interested in inference
regarding predictors’ effect on outcomes, so I derive the distribution of sample average treatment
effects in these models and procedures for inference in a variety of common contexts social
scientists encounter. Machine learning methods such as GP models can help social scientists avoid
misspecification bias (see Hainmueller and Hazlett 2014), and GP models in particular represent a
superior solution to spatial and temporal error correlation than existing approaches (Carlson 2021;
see also Gill 2021) and are more flexible and extensible than methods such as kernel-regulated least
squares advocated by Hainmueller and Hazlett (2014).
In sum, this dissertation presents substantive research on fundamental questions in the study
judicial politics—how the law develops and how it constrains judges’ behavior—as well as useful
advances in political methodology. In the conclusion I further explore the contributions of this
dissertation and avenues it presents for potential future research.
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Chapter 2
Explaining Legal Inconsistency
A wide range of observers have noted particularly inconsistent rules being produced by courts
across several areas of the law.1 For example, legal scholars complain the U.S. Supreme “Court’s
numerous [federal] preemption cases follow no predictable jurisprudential or analytical pattern”
(Dinh 2000).2 Political commentators criticize the Court’s “Establishment Clause decisions that
have been, in the words of Alice in Wonderland, curiouser and curiouser,” and hope the Court
will “leaven with clarity the confusion it has sown” (Will 2019). Supreme Court Justice Clarence
Thomas bemoans “an Establishment Clause jurisprudence in shambles,” claiming the Court’s
“jurisprudence has confounded the lower courts and rendered the constitutionality of displays of
religious imagery on government property anyone’s guess. . . ” (Utah Highway Patrol Assoc. v.
American Atheists Inc., 565 U.S. 994 (2011) at 994, Thomas, J., dissenting).
Courts’ policies are implemented by others, from lower courts applying appellate court rules,
to outside actors enforcing judicially created policies (Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck 2000,
5). When courts’ rulings are unpredictable, and their rules are confusing, it impedes these actors’
1. This chapter has been published as "Explaining Legal Inconsistency" in the Journal of Theoretical Politics (DOI:
10.1177/09516298211061159). I would like to thank Randall Calvert, Keith Schnakenberg, Jim Spriggs, Lee Epstein,
Morgan Hazelton, Jordan Carr Peterson, and anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. A previous version of
this paper was presented at the 2019 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.
2. Drahozal (2004) gives a book-length review of the inconsistency rampant in federalism cases.
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ability to implement judicial policies. Moreover, inconsistency in legal doctrine reduces judicial
legitimacy (Landa and Lax 2009, 959). Why would courts create confusing policies that endanger
judicial legitimacy and their efficacy as policymakers? Perhaps judges are free to act relatively
unconstrained (e.g. Segal and Spaeth 2002), and current court members simply prefer outcomes
inconsistent with prior cases. Or perhaps courts’ decisions are well explained by pronounced
rules, even when scholars and commentators believe an area of the law is in disarray (Segal 1984).
Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck (2000) explain that bargaining over opinion content among
justices may produce results inconsistent with what we might otherwise expect. However, none
of these accounts explain why courts’ descriptions of their decision rules do not provide clear
guidance for lower court judges and other policy enforcers.
I use a social choice theoretic model to show preference aggregation on collegial courts can
result in inconsistent rules when judges communicate policy in terms of subjective criteria that
depend on objective facts.3 That is, judges often explain rules using a low number of abstract
determinations that in turn are derived from specific facts of cases. I show this kind of multi-step
reasoning in appellate review can result in inconsistent collegial rules.
For example, in Fourth Amendment search and seizure cases, the constitutionality of police
conduct can depend on (1) the intrusiveness of the search or severity of the seizure, and (2)
whether the police had the requisite level of suspicion (e.g. probable cause) required to support
such conduct. The court must determine how intrusiveness and police suspicion translate into
outcomes, and further use the specific facts of cases to determine the level of police suspicion:
“As the Court recognizes, determinations of probable cause and reasonable suspicion involve a
two-step process. First, a court must identify all of the relevant historical facts . . . and second, it
must decide whether . . . those facts would give rise to a reasonable suspicion justifying a stop or
probable cause to search” (Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996) at 700–701, Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
3. For formal statements of results and proofs of propositions, see Appendix A.
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To make this even more concrete, consider the case Terry v. Ohio. In Terry, a police officer
observed Terry and two compatriots suspiciously “casing” a store. Although he had no other
information about the men, he believed a robbery was imminent, and “feared ‘they may have a
gun”’, so he approached them, stopped them, and frisked them for weapons. He found weapons
on Terry and one of the other men, and they were convicted of weapons charges. These concrete
events that happened, and the evidence collected, are the specific facts of the case, or the “historical
facts” as Justice Scalia puts it. While the Court did not find these facts amounted to probable
cause, they said the evidence of criminal conduct amounted to “reasonable suspicion”. Again,
though the Court did not find these facts constituted an arrest, the seizure of Terry did constitute
an investigatory stop. These findings are the abstract determinations I mentioned above, which I
will call doctrinal facts throughout the article. The Court announced investigatory stops may be
justified by reasonable suspicion; in other words, the Court updated doctrine.
When courts engage in such multi-step reasoning, opportunity for inconsistency in the resulting
collegial rules arises, even when all the judges possess well-behaved preferences. The problem
arises because with multiple levels of judgment or preference aggregation, judges can agree on outcomes while disagreeing on the proper justification for that outcome, so that applying the reasoning
relied on by a majority coalition in any one case can be inconsistent with collegial outcomes in other
cases. This source of inconsistency in the law is understudied despite related results in the literature
(e.g. Kornhauser 1992; Landa and Lax 2009) because models have left unexplored the interaction
between disagreements over doctrine and disagreements over intermediate legal determinations, or
doctrinal facts.4
This mechanism leading to doctrinal inconsistency raises implications for some areas of research
in judicial politics. For example, there is a large literature that uses case facts as explanatory
variables in empirical models of judicial behavior (e.g. Segal 1984; Richards and Kritzer 2002;
4. That is, while Kornhauser (1992) allows disagreement over intermediate determinations, and Lax (2007) and
Landa and Lax (2009) allow disagreement over doctrine, neither allow disagreement over both.
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Bartels and O’Geen 2015; Epstein, Parker, and Segal 2018). Studies utilizing doctrinal facts may
ignore that individual judges can have different determinations of their own on such doctrinal facts,
while if only historical facts are used, important inconsistencies in the reasoning presented by
courts can be obscured. There is also a large literature on principal-agent relationships in judicial
hierarchies (e.g. Cameron, Segal, and Songer 1994; Westerland et al. 2010; Baker and Kornhauser
2015). This paper raises an important question for future research of these relationships: the
decision to engage in the multi-step reasoning studied here is itself a strategic decision. If the
appellate court defers to trial court findings of doctrinal facts, this multi-step reasoning does not
occur. (See also the appendix titled “Deference to Trial Court Findings” for discussion of situations
in which appellate courts may even revisit findings on historical facts, another setting in which
such multi-step reasoning can occur). For example, in the Ornelas decision quoted above, the
Supreme Court resolved a circuit split over whether findings of probable cause should be reviewed
de novo or with deference (in favor of de novo review), resulting in multi-step reasoning in Fourth
Amendment cases. When will collegial appellate courts choose increased control over trial court
agents, even with the risk of the type of doctrinal inconsistency studied here, rather than defer to
agents’ findings?5
After a short survey of the substantive literature, I provide a brief overview of related models
before detailing the setup of a model that allows for courts’ multi-step reasoning. I then show why
inconsistency in the law can result when appellate courts communicate policy this way, as well as
when they can safely do so while maintaining clear policy; I illustrate these results with a simple
Fourth Amendment example.
5. See Lax (2012) for exploration of a similar tradeoff in judicial hierarchies.
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2.1

Causes and Consequences of Inconsistency

If an appellate court’s “jurisprudence [confounds] the lower courts” and makes the proper decision in
future cases “anyone’s guess” (Utah Highway Patrol Assoc., 565 U.S. at 994, Thomas, J., dissenting),
the court will be less effective as a policy maker. Such inconsistency also raises normative
concerns—crafting an inconsistent doctrine leaves citizens potentially less empowered to assert their
rights (since they can’t tell when they apply). Nevertheless, legal scholars highlight time and time
again various doctrines that have grown inconsistent, from death penalty jurisprudence (Robinson
and Simon 2006) to First Amendment jurisprudence (Post 1995) to federalism jurisprudence
(Drahozal 2004).
Empirical work has well documented the effects of unclear doctrine on courts’ policy-making
efficacy. Spriggs (1996) argues administrative agencies will be more likely to follow Supreme
Court opinions that offer clearer guidance, and finds evidence that agencies more closely follow
opinions that were more specific and explicit. Westerland et al. (2010) hypothesize that unclear
signals from the U.S. Supreme Court will lead to lower compliance by the appellate courts, finding
an increased number of concurrences indeed reliably correlated with lower compliance.
Empirical work has also uncovered some causes of inconsistency or complexity in judicial
behavior. Collins (2008) finds individual justices’ choices are more variable in complex cases.
Owens and Wedeking (2011) use text analysis methods to measure the cognitive complexity of
court decisions,6 finding, for example, that some justices provide clearer guidance in their opinion
than others on average, and that majority opinions are less clear than dissents, perhaps due to the
bargaining entailed in crafting a binding precedent (1032–1033; Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck
2000).
Related theoretical work includes the discovery of the “doctrinal paradox” (Kornhauser 1992)
and its extension (Landa and Lax 2009),7 as well as work on rules vs. standards (e.g. Clark 2016; Lax
6. Though they acknowledge that doctrinal complexity—the topic of this article—is another aspect of clarity of
Supreme Court opinions (Owens and Wedeking 2011, 1038).
7. Study of the phenomenon identified by Kornhauser (1992) as the doctrinal paradox spread throughout legal
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2012). The doctrinal paradox shows that outcomes depend on whether judges on collegial courts
decide cases by majority vote over outcomes or by majority vote over intermediate determinations,
such as whether police had probable cause. Interestingly, Kornhauser (1992, 447) explicitly
envisions the cases as coming from a fact space that the judges must then map to these intermediate
conclusions, but does not model how the judges make these intermediate determinations; accounting
for this step in judicial reasoning is one of the principal technical contributions of this article.
However, Kornhauser (1992) assumes legal rules are fixed, while appellate courts themselves
create legal rules. So Landa and Lax (2009) instead assume the intermediate conclusions are fixed,
but allow each judge on a collegial court to have their own preferred legal rule. With this setup,
the paradox that arises is that the rule implied for the court is different if the judges directly vote
over rules or vote over outcomes in cases. Additionally, “it might not be possible to form the same
type of rule for a court as a whole as any individual judge might have. That is, to the extent that
individual rules are each representative of coherent legal philosophies, it may not be possible to
construct a similarly principled collegial doctrine” (949). This captures a type of legal incoherence,
and I build on these two models to additionally capture uncertainty, or the type of incoherent policy
that renders the proper decision in a case “anyone’s guess” as Justice Thomas complained.
The rules vs. standards literature tackles a separate but related issue to the doctrinal inconsistency
I study. These studies seek to explain when judges will issue specific policies and when they will
use vague policy. For example, Staton and Vanberg (2008) shows courts may use vague rules to
prevent observed noncompliance with rulings by ideologically divergent governments or to allow
leeway to governments that are ideologically aligned with the court.
Most on point for the present article in this vein are Clark (2016) and Lax (2012). Clark studies
the trade-off between an opinion that clearly disposes of cases closely related to the present case
and an opinion that is less precise but has more impact on dissimilar cases. Clark finds judges will
theory and social choice theory and became known also as the "discursive dilemma" (e.g., List 2012; List and Pettit
2002; Nehring and Puppe 2006, 2010).
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be more precise when the instant case is most representative of potential disputes and when they
anticipate being able to issue additional clarifying rulings in the future. This analysis starts from the
important point that judges generally cannot specify a complete mapping from cases to outcomes
in a single opinion. The import of Proposition 2.2 below, detailing the general susceptibility of
doctrine to inconsistency, involves this issue; inconsistency has real bite precisely when judges
cannot perfectly map every potential future dispute to an outcome.
Lax (2012) considers the ability of an appellate court to promulgate a bright-line rule that
depends only on an objective fact, or a standard based also on a subjective dimension such as
severity of the weather. In this context, we may say bright-line rules are specific or precise, whereas
standards based on a subjective dimension are less precise, either because the Court cannot perfectly
observe the subjective dimension or because it is difficult to specify doctrinal requirements on that
dimension. In the first case, standards are preferred despite their vagueness when the ability to
observe the subjective dimension is relatively higher, or there is lower risk of ideologically opposed
lower courts. In the second, standards can be attractive despite imprecision if the weight placed
on the subjective dimension in the Court’s preferences is high enough, or if the cost of writing
more precise opinions is low enough. This provides a nuanced account of incentives to rely on
potentially vague doctrine, but again, does not wrestle with inconsistency in doctrine.
Evidence exists that courts’ policy-making efficacy depends on legal clarity, and normatively
we may expect courts to consistently interpret legal rights. Empirical work has uncovered some
correlates of lack of clarity in the law, and theoretical work has shown conditions under which
judges may choose vagueness over precision and clarity. I extend models of case-based adjudication
(Kornhauser 1992) and rulemaking (Lax 2007) to show an explanation for inconsistent doctrine
embedded in legal reasoning: Judges generally engage in multiple steps of judgment aggregation,
and this multi-step reasoning provides more opportunity for inconsistency in aggregation than
previous models have accounted for.
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2.2

Rule Making on Collegial Courts

I use a case space model to study rule making on collegial courts (Lax 2011). A case space
model considers the set of all possible cases, or factual scenarios, a court could be presented with,
and represents judicial policy as dividing that space into outcomes. That is, the set of possible
cases is divided into two sets: the set of cases where plaintiffs win and the set of cases where
defendants win; or, the set of cases where government activity is permissible, and the set where it
is unconstitutional.
In a traditional case space model, the court is presented with a case x ∈ X ⊆ Rn , the set of
all possible cases the court could hear.8 Each judge j then has a preferred rule mapping cases to
outcomes ρj : X → {−1, 1}.9 The dimensions of X are interpreted as “whatever facts might be
considered relevant to the judges” (Landa and Lax 2009, 593). Often models consider these facts to
be high-level doctrinal concerns, such as the intrusiveness of a police search (Clark and Carrubba
2012), or sometimes specific “historical” facts, such as the speed at which a car is travelling (Lax
2012).
I will use as a running example the constitutionality of a seizure of a person—an investigatory
stop or an arrest—under the Fourth Amendment.10 The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
provides the “right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated. . . ” (U.S. Const. Amend. IV). However, courts “must evaluate the reasonableness
of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances” (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1 (1968) at 21). For example, while arrests require probable cause, investigatory stops are less
intrusive seizures that require only “reasonable suspicion” (Terry).
8. The dimensions of the case space could be the set of real numbers (e.g. Clark and Carrubba 2012), real intervals
such as [0, 1] (e.g. Lax 2007), or discrete sets such as {0, 1} (e.g. Landa and Lax 2009); the space may be unidimensional
(e.g. Hübert 2019) or multidimensional (e.g. Badawi and Baker 2015).
9. The dichotomous outcomes are sometimes presented with other labels, such as Y and N (e.g. Landa and Lax
2009).
10. Fourth Amendment doctrine is a familiar example both to empirical (e.g. Segal 1984) and theoretical (e.g. Clark
and Carrubba 2012) studies of case-based judicial decision making.
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So, we might think of the case space dimensions as the doctrinal concerns of the level of police
suspicion and severity of the seizure; an example of a rule in such a space is depicted in Figure
2.1a. In this example, there are some seizures so severe they could never be found constitutional,
some circumstances under which there is so little evidence of criminality that no seizure could be
constitutional, but as long as the seizure is sufficiently not severe and the police have sufficient
certainty that criminal conduct has occurred, the judge will find the seizure was constitutional.
Judges on collegial courts decide cases by majority rule over dispositions. The implicit collegial
rule, or ICR, is the mapping between cases and outcomes that results from these majority votes
over outcomes (Lax 2007, 595). In other words, the ICR represents “the law.”11 An example
of a three judge panel’s individual preferences and the resulting ICR is depicted in Figure 2.1b.
In this case the judges’ preferences aggregate to an ICR in which for the lowest range of police
suspicion, no seizure is warranted, for a moderate range of police suspicion low levels of seizure
are permissible, and at the highest range of police suspicion a much broader range of seizures are
found constitutional.

2.3

Model

Case space dimensions that capture high level doctrinal concerns are generated from historical
facts, as Justice Scalia discusses in the Ornelas exerpt quoted in the introduction. As Lax (2007)
explains, “in equal protection cases . . . the dimensions might include (1) how ‘suspect’ the class
invoked is . . . (2) how compelling the state interest is . . . and (3) how necessary the classification is
. . . . Or, these dimensions could be broken down further” (594). While the technology of traditional
case space models can be used to model decisions based on historical facts, doctrinal concerns, or
both, it lacks the ability to model the relationship between doctrinal concerns and the dimension
of historical facts they are derived from. Abstracting away from this relationship is useful for
11. I join Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr in claiming, "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and
nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law" (Holmes 1897, 461).
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(Inverse) Police Suspicion

(Inverse) Police Suspicion

Constitutional
Unconstitutional

Severity of Seizure

Constitutional
Unconstitutional

Severity of Seizure

(a) Judge 1’s rule. The shaded region is the
set of cases the judge finds the police seizure to
be constitutional and in the unshaded region the
judge finds the police conduct unconstitutional.

(b) The ICR. Dashed and dotted lines mark the set
of cases in which each judge rules police conduct
constitutional. In the shaded region, the court as
a whole rules it constitutional.

Figure 2.1: An example individual rule and ICR for Fourth Amendment police seizure cases.
Note: The case space is comprised of two dimensions: severity of the police seizure, where larger
values indicate a more intrusive seizure, and inverse police suspicion, where larger values indicate
less certainty that criminal conduct has occurred.
analyzing other aspects of judicial decision making. However, to understand why outside observers
are confused by judicial doctrine, it will be useful to separately represent the high dimensional
space of all possible historical facts and the lower dimensional doctrinal space, and the relationship
between these spaces.
A legal case presented to a court can be uniquely identified by its historical facts, such as whether
a person seized by the police was placed in handcuffs or not, or how long a person was detained.
We will say there are N potentially relevant dimensions of historical facts, so that H ⊆ RN is the
set of all possible combinations of historical facts.
A set of judges J (with |J| odd) must decide cases presented to it from H, and assign them
one of two outcomes {−1, 1}. So, as in other case space models, we will discuss policy as a
partition of cases into outcomes. However, judges (and the public they communicate policies to)
do not think about policy by considering every possible combination of historical facts, even if they
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could. They think about and communicate policy in more abstract terms informed by the historical
facts, such as the severity of a police seizure or the degree of police certainty of criminality that
supports the seizure. So we also need to define a lower dimensional doctrinal space, D ⊆ Rn , with
1 < n < N .12 Then each judge j has a preferred doctrine δj mapping D to {−1, 1}. A doctrine
is monotonic if for any two points d, d 0 ∈ D, di ≥ di 0 ∀ i implies δ(d) ≥ δ(d 0 ). We will assume
the judges (and other relevant actors such as the public or lower court judges attempting to comply
with the collegial appellate court’s rulings) can “consistently label” the dimensions of H and D
such that higher values of any hk or di should lead to a weakly higher outcome, all else equal.
Unfortunately, as we will see, judges can disagree not only over doctrine, but how historical
facts map onto doctrinal facts.13 Not only could judges disagree whether a particular type of police
seizure needs to be supported by probable cause or only by reasonable suspicion, but they could
disagree about whether the historical facts support a finding of probable cause or not. So, we
add the last moving part to the model: each judge j maps historical facts on to D; I will call this
mapping a “fact finding function” fj : H → D.14 For convenience, for a case h and a fact finding
function fj , we will write dij to mean the ith element of fj (h). A fact finding function is monotonic
if for any two points h, h 0 ∈ H, hk ≥ h 0k ∀ k implies dij ≥ d 0ij ∀ i. For the remainder of the article,
I assume all fj and δj are monotonic.
12. A one dimensional doctrinal space could be possible but would be rare. Some case space models present a
simplified unidimensional case even when the lower dimensional abstract doctrine space is still multidimensional.
For example, Clark and Carrubba (2012) discuss a unidimensional case space for police search cases, where the
dimension is the intrusiveness of the search, when in fact such a formulation must (at least) be some combination of the
search’s intrusiveness and police certainty of criminality. (Consider that a search at intrusiveness level x that would be
constitutional given probable cause may still be unconstitutional in the absence of probable cause). Such an abstraction
is useful for studying some questions but not for examining why judicial policy can appear inconsistent to the citizens
and other judges charged with following them.
13. Note that Landa and Lax (2008) also discuss the various types of disagreements which judges on a collegial
court may face. They make connections from related models to a couple of aspects of disagreement over the mapping
between historical facts to doctrinal facts, though none directly address the difficulty discussed in this article.
14. In practice, the judges would be presented with not only the lower court’s determination of the case’s placement
in H given the evidence presented at trial, but also D, but we will ignore for now the lower court’s determination
of a case’s placement in doctrinal space. I discuss appellate courts’ deferenece to trial courts’ findings as to a case’s
placement in H and D in Appendix B. In short, appellate judges generally defer to trial courts regarding historical facts,
though exceptions can apply in constitutional cases (Hoffman 2001; Redish and Gohl 2017), but are less deferential
regarding doctrinal concerns. Readers interested in this procedural issue should consult Appendix B.

14

In sum, each judge’s preferred disposition is thus determined by δj (fj (h)); the judge is presented
with the historical facts, they determine how those facts relate to the doctrinal dimensions they find
relevant, and thus how the case should be decided according to their preferred doctrine. Thus, a
judge’s preferred rule, or mapping from unique cases to outcomes, is a pair ρj = (fj , δj ). This
process is depicted in Figure 2.2.
D

fj

(Inverse) Police Suspicion

H

Constitutional
Unconstitutional
δj

Severity of Seizure
Figure 2.2: Assigning outcomes by translating a fact space to a doctrine space.
Note: A judge j is presented with a set of historical facts, a point in a pontentially high dimensional
space H. Cases in this issue area are discussed using broader doctrinal terms—the lower dimensional space D. So, the judge uses the function fj to translate the case from a point in H to a point
in D, the space in which she describes her preferred partition (δj ) of cases into −1 outcomes and 1
outcomes.
Judges decide cases by majority vote over outcomes. Similarly to Landa and Lax (2009), define
an outcome set as specifying the outcome (−1 or 1) with each case h ∈ H, and the collegial
outcome set as the outcome set formed by majority voting among J over the outcome in each
case h. A consistent rule is a rule ρ = (f, δ) such that f is monotonic and δ is monotonic in f .
The implicit collegial rule (ICR) is the rule ρm = (fm , δm ) constructed as follows: fm takes the
(dimension by dimension) median value of the fj for every j in the majority coalition for every
15

h ∈ H; and δm maps Dm to {−1, 1} using the collegial outcome set. A summary of notation used
is presented in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Notation Used
j
J
H
hk
D
di
fj
δj
ρ
ρm

2.4

A judge on the collegial appellate court.
The set of judges on the collegial appellate court.
The set of all possible combinations of historical facts.
One of the N dimensions of H.
The set of all possible combinations of doctrinal determinations.
One of the n dimensions of D.
The mapping from historical facts to doctrinal dimensions as
seen by judge j.
The mapping from doctrinal determinations to outcomes preferred by judge j.
A pair (f, δ) mapping H to outcomes through D such that
the outcome in case h is δ(f (h)).
The implicit collegial rule (fm , δm ), where fm takes the (dimension by dimension) median value of the fj for every j in
the majority coalition for every h ∈ H and δm maps Dm to
{−1, 1} using the collegial outcome set.

Inconsistency from Multi-step Reasoning

Let us start with the simplest case, where the judges happen to agree on doctrine; that is, δj is the
same for all j.15 For example, suppose the judges agree that some seizures of a person are never
justified, probable cause is needed to justify others, and that some seizures can be justified merely
by reasonable suspicion, but that the judges disagree on the set of historical facts that support a
finding of probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
Three types of doctrines in particular will be of interest, both because they are common types
15. This is the case examined by, for example, Kornhauser (1992).
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of legal doctrines and because of their aggregation properties. Call a doctrine δ such that

δ(d) =




1

if d · w ≥ τ



−1

otherwise,

where τ is a scalar threshold and w is a vector of weights on the dimensions of D, a balancing
test.16 A doctrine δ such that
δ(d) =




1

if di ≥ τi ∀ i



−1 otherwise,
where τ is a vector of thresholds of length n, shall be called a conjunctive test.17 Finally, define a
disjunctive test as a doctrine δ such that

δ(d) =




1

if ∃ i : di ≥ τi



−1 otherwise,
where τ is a vector of thresholds of length n.
Then we can state the following:
Proposition 2.1. If all δj = δ ∗ , and δ ∗ is a balancing test, then ρm is a consistent rule. If δ ∗ is a
conjunctive or disjunctive test, ρm need not be a consistent rule.
Call the situation in the first sentence of Proposition 2.1 a “shared balancing test.” Then let
δ = {δj } (and similarly for f ) and let F(δ) be the set of combinations of monotonic fact finding
functions for the judges such that ρm is not consistent given δ and f . Now we will deal with the
more general case where judges may disagree on doctrine and state a more ominous result, which
is a more general form of the second sentence in Proposition 2.1:
16. One may note the similarity between such a doctrine and what Landa and Lax (2009) call "base rules."
17. Note that balancing, conjunctive, and disjunctive tests are all monotonic doctrines.
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Proposition 2.2. If δ is not a shared balancing test, F(δ) is nonempty.
The implications of Proposition 2.2 explain a structural reason embedded in our common
law system for inconsistent doctrine. Because the judges are engaging in multi-step reasoning to
determine case outcomes, in general the court’s opinions taken as a whole can be inconsistent in
the sense that doctrine is not monotonic in the findings of legal facts. To understand why such
monotonicity is crucial, consider a situation in which we have not observed the court’s rulings
in all of (the infinite number of) the potential cases, nor has the court completely revealed in its
opinions ρm . (Of course, this is in fact the situation we find ourselves in at all times).18 Then what
we can say about the law, or “the prophecies of what the courts will do in fact” (Holmes 1897),
becomes very limited. If δm is guaranteed to be monotonic in fm , we could deduce outcomes in
some regions of Dm , and we will have some information about the set of fact finding functions that
could be fm . However, if δm is not guaranteed to be monotonic in fm , much less could be said about
the outcomes we should expect in cases not observed. Whereas Clark (2016) models the Court’s
strategy for reducing the uncertainty lower courts (and perhaps other actors) have about outcomes
in cases so far unobserved, this result reveals a source of uncertainty courts have no choice over.
Moreover, when the revealed outcomes show δm to be non-monotonic in fm , the collegial
doctrine is revealed to be “perverse” (Lax 2007, 594; Landa and Lax 2009, 952).19 In other words,
a person observing two different cases may believe in case one, the police had probable cause and
conducted a seizure of a person amounting to an arrest, and in the second case, the police arrested
a suspect with more evidence of criminality than in the first case, but find the court rules the police
18. See, for example, the discussion of the imperfect ability of judges to communicate their preferences in Clark
(2016).
19. Callander and Clark (2017) consider not expecting monotonicity of legal rules, and discuss expecting only a
reliance on the dictate that like cases be treated alike (187). This makes sense in the context explored there, where
the outcome is not binary, but a latent legal outcome in R. Then similarity across a unidimensional case space that is
non-monotonic is easy to understand. However, when we allow ourselves to describe doctrine in multiple dimensions,
"wrinkles" or "cut outs" that Callander and Clark (2017) account for with non-monotonicity can often be accounted
for by a monotonic rule in a richer historical fact and/or doctrine space. It’s also harder to say what similarity in
points "close" to each other in the case space is when we are dealing only with the dichotomous outcomes and not a
latent legal outcome, absent monotonicity. Additionally, in at least some areas of the law, like the Fourth Amendment
example discussed here, monotonicity is a normative expectation.
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conduct constitutional in the first case but unconstitutional in the second. The ICR may even assign
different outcomes to cases at the same location in the doctrine space. For example, a person may
view two different set of historical facts and determine that in both cases police had probable cause
and conducted a seizure of a person amounting to an arrest, and therefore acted in accordance with
the Fourth Amendment, but observe the court rule the actions as constitutional in one case and
unconstitutional in the other.
Let us make this example concrete, with H = [0, 1]4 , D = [0, 1]2 , and the judges’ fact-finding
functions and doctrines as given in Table 2.2.20 Each of the judges has monotonic doctrines
(disjunctive tests) and monotonic fact-finding functions; these are depicted in panels (a)–(c) of
Figure 2.3, which show how each judge would place every case in D and which outcome they
would choose for those cases if they were deciding cases unilaterally. However, the collegial rule
is decidedly inconsistent, as depicted in panel (d), which shows the implicit collegial rule, or how
the collegial fact-finding function fm would place every case in D and which outcome is assigned
under the collegial outcome set. Although difficult to depict, in the darkly shaded region where both
outcomes occur, the density of cases receiving each outcome varies, and importantly sometimes
in an alternating fashion. We see both types of problems mentioned in the previous paragraph:
opposing outcomes occurring at the same point in D, and violations of strict monotonicity as well.
Table 2.2: Doctrines and fact-finding functions for the judges on the collegial court.
j
1
2
3

f

δ

(0.5h1 + 0.5h2 , 0.5h3 + 0.5h4 ) 1 ⇔ d1 > 0.750 ∨ d2 > 0.750
(0.6h1 + 0.4h2 , 0.4h3 + 0.6h4 ) 1 ⇔ d1 > 0.375 ∨ d2 > 0.750
(0.4h1 + 0.6h2 , 0.6h3 + 0.4h4 ) 1 ⇔ d1 > 0.750 ∨ d2 > 0.375

We can highlight a few specific cases to make this easier to see. Consider the cases listed in
Table 2.3; these cases are labeled with their number in Figure 2.3. In case 1, both judges 2 and
3 find the case satisfies one element of their disjunctive test (though different ones), so both vote
20. This configuration of preferred doctrines is also used in Figure 2.1.
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Table 2.3: Example cases showing inconsistency.
d

Outcome

1

1
2
(0.70, 0.05, 0.75, 0.00)
3
m

(0.375, 0.375)
(0.440, 0.300)
(0.310, 0.450)
(0.375, 0.375)

1

2

1
2
(0.15, 0.60, 0.15, 0.60)
3
m

(0.375, 0.375)
(0.330, 0.420)
(0.420, 0.330)
(0.375, 0.375)

−1

3

1
2
(0.15, 0.65, 0.40, 0.40)
3
m

(0.400, 0.400)
(0.350, 0.400)
(0.450, 0.400)
(0.375, 0.400)

−1

Case

h

j

for outcome 1, while in case 2, both judges 1 and 3 find the case satisfies neither element of their
disjunctive test, and so both vote for outcome −1. So, while fm places both cases at (0.375, 0375),
they receive opposing outcomes! This is so because while the judges’ individual preferences at both
levels of aggregation are assumed to be very well behaved, the different levels of aggregation do not
always agree with each other. Then, in case 3, judges 1 and 2 find the case satisfies neither element
of their disjunctive test, and so both vote for outcome −1, resulting in a case at fm = (0.375, 0.4)
having an outcome of −1 even though a case at fm = (0.375, 0.375) has an outcome of 1.
Not only is the implicit collegial rule inconsistent, the collegial outcome set is also not monotonic
in any of the judges’ projection of historical facts into doctrine space, as depicted in Figure 2.4.
Table 2.4 singles out three more cases for consideration, all of which are labeled in the panels of
Figure 2.4. Cases 4 and 5 cause inconsistency under both f1 and f3 . For judge 1, cases 4 and 5
occupy the same point in D1 but receive opposite collegial outcomes. For judge 3, case 4 is more
extreme on both doctrinal dimensions than case 5, but receives a -1 outcome where case 5 receives
a 1 outcome; that is, this is a situation where in case 4, judge 3 considers that there is both less
evidence of criminality and a more severe seizure than in case 5, but the court rules that the seizure
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Table 2.4: Further example cases showing inconsistency.
h

j

d

Outcome

(0, 0.875, 0.875, 0)

1
2
3
m

(0.438, 0.438)
(0.350, 0.350)
(0.525, 0.525)
(0.394, 0.394)

−1

5

1
2
(0.125, 0.75, 0.75, 0.125)
3
m

(0.438, 0.438)
(0.375, 0.375)
(0.500, 0.500)
(0.438, 0.438)

1

6

1
2
3
m

(0.438, 0.438)
(0.525, 0.525)
(0.350, 0.350)
(0.394, 0.394)

−1

Case

4

(0.875, 0, 0, 0.875)

in case 4 is constitutional whereas the seizure in case 5 is not. For judge 2, cases 5 and 6 reveal
inconsistency in a similar manner to cases 4 and 5 for judge 3.
Of course, in this example, the structure of H is relatively simple, and the fj appear easy enough
to communicate. Even if lower court judges and members of the public have not had a chance
to observe the full mapping from H to Dm to outcomes, assuming the judges had full knowledge
of their preferences they could simply announce when deciding any case the association between
H and the collegial outcome set. However, it is important to note the differences between an
easily understood toy example like this and the even worse situation we generally find ourselves
in. Generally H will be of a much higher dimensionality than 4; consider our Fourth Amendment
example, where it is relevant whether the police restrained the suspect, the duration of the seizure,
the credibility of information the police are acting on, what the supect was doing at the time of the
seizure, etc. (many of which could be further broken down into multiple historical fact dimensions,
but were not for simplicity here). Moreover, the judges are unlikely to know even their own full
mapping fj . For example, in the model of Callander and Clark (2017), the High Court does not
know with certainty their preferred legal outcome in a particular set of factual circumstances until
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they observe such a case, a reasonable assumption in many contexts. Additionally, judges are even
commonly presented with new historical factual dimensions that they have never considered before,
and they often do not know how such facts affect where the judge will place the case in D until
they have occasion to consider it.
In other words, judges often cannot create general doctrinal statements in terms of H; they must
communicate their general decision principles in terms of D, and relate cases h ∈ H to D as they
come. In this setting, I have shown a very troublesome result; policies generated and communicated
using such multi-step reasoning are generally subject to doctrinal inconsistency.

2.5

Discussion

Legal inconsistency is a problem, both for judges as policy makers, since agents and outside
actors cannot follow or implement rules they do not understand, and for the public, who might
normatively expect consistent application of legal rights. The prior literature offers explanations
for inconsistency in individual judges’ choices and their preferences (e.g. Collins 2008; Maltzman,
Spriggs, and Wahlbeck 2000) or for lack of precision in doctrine (e.g. Clark 2016; Fox and Vanberg
2014; Lax 2012; Staton and Vanberg 2008). Some sources of inconsistency in doctrine have been
highlighted by Lax (2007) and Landa and Lax (2008, 2009); by expanding on such case-space
models to account for judges’ multi-step reasoning, I highlight a new source of legal inconsistency.
When we allow for disagreement over both how historical facts should be aggregated to doctrinal
dimensions and how the doctrine space should be partitioned into outcomes, the resulting judgment
and preference aggregation among judges displays inconsistency even under strict assumptions
about how well-behaved the individual judgments and preferences are. The general presence of the
danger of this inconsistency explains why so often, courts’ doctrines become inconsistent (Drahozal
2004; Post 1995; Robinson and Simon 2006; Will 2019).
This model also raises implications for other areas of judicial politics research. Related to
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research on the principal-agent relationship between appellate courts and trial courts, when will
collegial appellate courts defer to lower court agents’ placement of cases in doctrine space to avoid
this source of inconsistency on doctrine, and when will they exert more control despite the danger
of doctrinal inconsistency shown in this article? For empirical research that uses case facts as
explanatory variables, care should be used to recognize that individual judges can have different
determinations of their own on such doctrinal facts, and if only historical facts are used, important
inconsistencies in the reasoning presented by courts may be obscured.
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(Inverse) Police Suspicion

(Inverse) Police Suspicion

Constitutional
Unconstitutional

213

Severity of Seizure

1

(b) δ2 with cases placed according to f2

Constitutional
Unconstitutional

(Inverse) Police Suspicion

(Inverse) Police Suspicion

23

Severity of Seizure

(a) δ1 with cases placed according to f1

1

Constitutional
Unconstitutional

3
2

Severity of Seizure

Constitutional Both
Unconstitutional outcomes
occur

312

Severity of Seizure

(c) δ3 with cases placed according to f3

(d) δm in Dm

Figure 2.3: An example of an inconsistent doctrine.
Note: The doctrine space is comprised of two dimensions: severity of the police seizure, where
larger values indicate a more intrusive seizure, and inverse police suspicion, where larger values
indicate less certainty that criminal conduct has occurred. The judges all have preferred monotonic
doctrines and monotonic fact-finding functions; the judges’ preferred rules are depicted in panels
(a)–(c). However, the implicit collegial rule is inconsistent as depicted in panel (d). In each panel,
the three cases from Table 2.3 are labeled with their identifying number.
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Severity of Seizure

(c) D3

(d) Dm

Figure 2.4: An example of an inconsistent doctrine.
Note: The doctrine space is comprised of two dimensions: severity of the police seizure, where
larger values indicate a more intrusive seizure, and inverse police suspicion, where larger values
indicate less certainty that criminal conduct has occurred. The judges all have preferred monotonic
doctrines and monotonic fact-finding functions, but the collegial outcome set is not monotonic in
any of the judges’ projection of historical facts into doctrine space, or even the projection taking
the dimension-by-dimension median placement of the majority coalition in every case.
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Chapter 3
Inference in Gaussian Process Models for
Political Science
Gaussian process (GP) models, a class of machine learning techniques, are increasingly being
employed to study politics, from measuring ideology (Gill 2021; Duck-Mayr, Garnett, and Montgomery 2020)1 to dealing with violations of conditional independence in time-series cross-sectional
data (Carlson 2021).2 GP models are powerful tools to model the relationship between predictors
and outcomes when the functional form mapping predictors to response is imperfectly known or
observations may not be conditionally independent, common settings in political science. However,
inference in the machine learning setting often focuses (sometimes exclusively) on prediction, while
other inferential quantities are often of interest to political scientists. I show how these models can
be used to obtain quantities of interest to political scientists, including a novel derivation of average
marginal effects for GP models.3 I first provide a primer on GP models, explaining their particular
1. Gill (2021) uses “spatial kriging,” which is a type of GP model, to extrapolate ideology measures spatially across
the U.S., while Duck-Mayr, Garnett, and Montgomery (2020) develop a novel GP item response theoretic model
(GPIRT).
2. I would like to thank Jacob Montgomery and participants at Washington University in St. Louis’ Political Data
Science Lab for their helpful comments.
3. The full derivations can be found in the appendix; in the main body of the paper I present results and practical
guidance.
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import for political science specifically. I highlight their nascent use in political science, briefly
explaining existing approaches to inference with GP models in the political science literature. I
then outline how to obtain a number of other quantities of interest and provide practical guidance
in the use of these models to enable the discipline to better harness these powerful tools for social
scientific inference.

3.1

A Primer on GP Models

Generally we want to reason about the relationship between predictors X and outcomes y. So, we
generally say

yi = f (xi ) + εi ,

(3.1)

where yi is our observed outcome for observation i, xi is our observed vector of predictors for
observation i, and εi is the error term—some added random noise. Then, we want to learn about
f (X). A stereotypical approach in political science is to assume a functional form for f , and that
the noise elements εi are independently distributed. In that case our task is to perform inference on
the parameters of f . A number of non-parametric approaches are available when the form of f is
unknown, and a variety of statistical fixes have been developed for various correlation structures of
ε.
A non-parametric approach common in the machine learning literature and now starting to
gain traction in political science is to model f as a Gaussian process (GP) (Rasmussen and
Williams 2006).4 While there are many methods that have been developed to accomplish nonparameteric inference or handle error correlation, GP models have risen to prominence because
4. Rasmussen and Williams (2006) is a comprehensive textbook for GP classification and regression. A reader
seeking a treatment that is much more in-depth should consult Rasmussen and Williams (2006).
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in addition to their flexibility, they represent a principled, probabilistic approach that presents a
very general framework applicable in a variety of settings (Cheng et al. 2019). Moreover, they can
outperform even tailored models for many inferential problems; for example, Carlson (2021) finds
GP regression to be more effective at handling error correlation in time-series cross-sectional data
than other existing approaches.
A GP is an infinite dimensional generalization of the normal distribution, where any finite
subcollection of the process’ variables are normally distributed. This is accomplished by specifying
the mean and covariance of the distribution as a function of the predictors:

f ∼ GP (µ (X) , K (X, X)) ,

(3.2)

where µ is a function (such as, for example, Xβ for a vector of coefficients β) that gives the mean
of the distribution of f at X and K (X, X 0 ) is a matrix-valued function that gives the covariance
between values of f at X and X 0 , such that for any finite set of observations X, f = f (X) has a
prior distribution

f ∼ N (µ (X) , K (X, X)) .

(3.3)

In the regression case, where y is continuous and we use a normal likelihood with variance
σy2 , we can then learn about f after observing X and y by appyling Bayes’ theorem along with
Gaussian identities to derive the exact posterior over f ,

f | X, y ∼ N (m∗ , C∗ ) ,
m∗ = µ (X) + KKy−1 (y − µ (X)) ,
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(3.4)
(3.5)

C∗ = K − KKy−1 K,

(3.6)

Ky = K + σy2 I,

(3.7)

where we write K = K (X, X) for more compact notation.5 Notice, then, that (for example)
Bayesian linear regression is simply a special case of GP regression; GP regression with µ (X) = 0
and K (X) = XX T returns the same solution as linear regression with standard normal priors on
the coefficients.
This allows us to learn about potentially nonlinear functions of X with very mild assumptions.
The assumptions we are making about f are largely through our choice of the mean function µ and
the covariance function, or kernel, K. The common choice in the machine learning literature is to
choose µ (X) = 0, giving a vague prior over f where all learning about f goes through the kernel.
We may also choose a linear mean, µ (X) = Xβ, encoding an assumption that f should have a
linear trend, though perhaps with nonlinear deviations or correlated errors.
An overwhelmingly popular choice for the kernel is the squared exponential covariance function,
in which the covariance between f (xi ) and f (xj ) is given by

k (xi , xj ) = σf2

−0.5

X (xid − xjd )2
d

`2d

!
,

(3.8)

where σf2 is a scale factor scaling the entire prior covariance matrix and ` is a vector of length
scales. This kernel corresponds to assuming that (1) f is smooth,6 and (2) the correlation between
values of f should decrease with distance in the covariate space. Then ` determines how we define
“closeness” along each dimension of X. Often an isotropic version of this kernel is used where `
is instead a scalar, treating distance in every dimension the same. This kernel should similarly be
5. Although this derivation is available in multiple sources in varying levels of detail, including Rasmussen and
Williams (2006), I provide a derivation in the appendix as well.
6. For scholars interested in modeling functions that are not smooth, other kernel options are available with a similar
proximity assumption. Please consult Chapter 4 in Rasmussen and Williams (2006) for details.
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most useful in political science; these assumptions match up to problems where we must account
for correlated errors across space or time (Carlson 2021; Gill 2021), and notably is also equivalent
to a linear model with infinite basis expansion.
To make this more concrete, consider the following example, where

f (x) = 2 sin (2x) + x,

(3.9)

y = f (x) + ε,

(3.10)

ε ∼ N (0, 1) .

(3.11)

So, we have a function mapping the single predictor variable x to outcomes y with a linear trend
and we have independent noise, but the function also has systematic nonlinear deviations. Figure
3.1a shows a vague, zero-mean GP prior over f , using the squared exponential covariance function.
I simulated 250 x values, drawn from a uniform distribution with bounds −π and π (which allows
for two full oscillations of f ), then simulated corresponding y values with standard normal noise.
We can see the posterior from Equation (3.4) depicted in Figure 3.1b; essentially we have taken
the somewhat mild assumptions encoded by the covariance function that f is smooth and that
covariance between function outputs decreases with distance in x to derive a reasonable estimate
of f (depicted with the solid line) with a measure of uncertainty (depicted with the shaded region).
For modeling discrete outcomes, the posterior becomes intractable; however, good approximations of the posterior in important cases have been derived. For example, for dichotomous
outcomes, we simply say

Pr (yi = 1) = σ (f (xi )) ,
f ∼ GP (µ (X) , K (X)) ,
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(3.12)
(3.13)
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Figure 3.1: An example GP prior and posterior for the function f (x) = 2 sin (2x) + x. Simulated
data points are depicted with crosses, the prior (posterior) mean with a solid line and the 95% CI
with a shaded region, and the true f (x) with a dashed line.
where f is then a latent function fed though σ, which is some sigmoid “squashing” function mapping
the reals to [0, 1], such as using a logistic or probit likelihood, to obtain the probability of a postitive
response. This gives us a very similar setup to a generalized linear model such as the probit or
logit regression, with the difference being that we do not assume as much about the structure of the
latent function f . While the posterior does not have a closed form as in the regression case, we can
solve for a Laplace approximation to the posterior centered at the posterior mode f̂ ,


−1 
,
f | X, y ∼ N f̂ , K −1 + W



f̂ = µ (X) + K ∇ log p y | f̂ ,


W = −∇∇ log p y | f̂ ,

(3.14)
(3.15)
(3.16)

and other approximations based on minimizing Kullbeck-Liebler divergence are available as well,
in addition to being able to simulate the posterior via MCMC sampling, commonly utilizing an
elliptical slice sampler (Murray, Adams, and MacKay 2010).
Taking the same example function and simulated x values we used to illustrate GP regression,
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Figure 3.2: An example GP prior and posterior for the function f (x) = 2 sin(2x) + x, where the
data were simulated as x ∼ U (−π, π), Pr(y = 1) = σ(f (x)), where σ is the logistic function.
Observations receiving positive labels are depicted in the rug on the top margin, while observations
receiving negative labels are depicted in the rug on the bottom margin; the prior (posterior) mean
with a solid line and the 95% CI with a shaded region, and the true f (x) with a dashed line.
I draw corresponding dichotomous y values where Pr (y = 1) = σ (f (x)), where σ is the logistic
function. A zero mean GP prior with squared exponential covariance function is depicted in Figure
3.2a, and the Laplace approximation of the posterior from Equation (3.14) is depicted in Figure
3.2b.
Modelling the relationship between predictors and outcomes as a GP offers a flexible but
principled approach with a number of advantages over other approaches. Unlike parametric
approaches, we can be agnostic a priori as to the shape of the relationship between predictors and
outcomes, accounting for our typical uncertainty over functional form as social scientists. When
compared to many non-parametric approaches that are similarly agnostic, the GP approach provides
a more principled probabilistic approach that is more readily extended to varied settings. Finally, as
I show in Section 3.3, the GP approach still allows us to recover and make probabilistic statements
about inferential quantities of interest to political scientists.
For many political science applications, Gaussian process regression or classification represents
a useful approach to guard against misspecification bias and handle error correlation, though there
are some tradeoffs to consider. The main drawback of the method is scalability; as you can
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see in Equations (3.4) and (3.14), obtaining the posterior distribution requires matrix inversion,
which scales cubically with the number of observations, though there are methods to ameliorate
the scaling problem at the cost of some precision (Liu et al. 2020). Additionally, if there are
very strong theoretical reasons to believe (1) the exact model specification is known, so that we
need not guard against misspecification bias, and (2) we can actually credibly assume conditional
independence of observations, slightly more precision in estimation may be gained from parametric
models over the GP models. Finally, we may worry about overfitting, particularly when discussing
relationships found in the data that were not hypothesized. However, in model selection steps
where hyperparameters are chosen to maximize the log marginal likelihood (see Section 3.3), the
log marginal likelihood includes a complexity penalty term to help guard against this, resulting in
a sort of “automatic trade-off” between data fit and model complexity (Rasmussen and Williams
2006, 110–113). Moreover, this concern can be easily ameliorated via k-fold cross-validation to
ensure overfitting has not occurred (Rasmussen and Williams 2006, 109, 111–112).

3.2

GP Models in Political Science

While GP models have a longer history in statistics and machine learning, they are just beginning
to take hold in the study of politics. The GP approach is particularly suited to the study of politics
as political scientists often confront situations in which we should acknowledge some uncertainty
regarding functional form, or (as may be the modal case in political science) the common assumption
of independent errors is violated.
Carlson (2021) considers time series cross-sectional (TSCS) data, common in many areas of
political science, and recommends GP regression for those settings. Carlson (2021) shows GP
regression outperforms a variety of previous approaches such as lagged dependent variable, fixed
effects, and random effects specifications, as well as panel-corrected standard errors in the TSCS
setting. Gill (2021) similarly utilizes a GP model to handle spatial autocorrelation.
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Duck-Mayr, Garnett, and Montgomery (2020) develop an IRT model where, rather than assuming the functional form of the response functions, a GP prior is placed over latent response
functions fed into a logistic likelihood. Among their applications demonstrating the method, the
authors estimate ideology of members of the House of Representatives in the 116th U.S. Congress.
They show this more flexible approach that acknowledges uncertainty over the functional form
of the roll call votes’ response functions allows for more plausible estimates of extremist members’ ideology; while parametric methods that impose monotonicity of responses in ideology force
extreme members such as Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez who often vote against the moderate
proposals of her own party to be placed closer to the opposing party, a flexible GP approach can
recognize that members such as she should be placed at the end of the ideological spectrum and
instead allow the item response function to bend downwards in such situations.
As political scientists are increasingly taking advantage of the flexible GP approach to handle
data that pose difficulties for inference using traditional approaches, I next provide practical guidance
for applied researchers and derive distributions of inferential quantities of interest to political
scientists that are not covered in the machine learning literature where the lion’s share of study of
GP models has occurred.

3.3

Tools for Inference in GP Models

A common goal for those employing GP models is out of sample prediction, so the typical inferential
quantity of interest is the distribution of the unknown function at test points. The machine learning
literature on GP models has largely focused on this sort of inference in various settings. Political
scientists are more often interested in parsing out the effects of the predictors. After explaining the
usual process for inference in GP models, I will also show how to derive two types of effects of
predictors: the distribution of coefficients if a linear mean function is employed, and the distribution
of average marginal effects of predictors whether or not a linear mean function is employed. The
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former is useful for determining the contribution of a predictor to a linear trend within f , while the
latter is necessary for uncovering the full average effect of a predictor on outcomes, since we allow
for a potentially nonlinear relationship between predictors and outcomes. A convenient interface
to obtain the distribution of all of these quantities is provided in an R package.7
When the goal is prediction, inference for GP models often follows the following sequence:
first, make choices about the GP prior, including the structure of the mean and covariance functions;
next, set the parameters of the mean and covariance functions (such as the coefficients of a linear
mean function, or the scale factor of a squared exponential covariance function) as a model selection
step by choosing them to use the GP prior that maximizes the log marginal likelihood of the model
given the training data; finally, use the training data and the selected hyperparameters to predict out
of sample for test data. This workflow is very effective for generating probabilistic predictions for
unknown data generating processes. The posterior predictive distribution for GP regression at test
cases X∗ is


f ∗ | y, X ∼ N µ (X∗ ) + K∗ Ky−1 (y − µ (X)) , K∗∗ − K∗ Ky−1 K∗T ,

(3.17)

with a common shorthand of K∗ = K (X∗ , X) and K∗∗ = K (X∗ , X∗ ), and the posterior predictive
distribution for classification (using the Laplace approximation) is




−1 T 
f ∗ | y, X ∼ N µ (X∗ ) + K∗ ∇ log p y | f̂ , K∗∗ − K∗ K + W −1
K∗ .

(3.18)

However, often other inferential quantities are of more interest than out of sample predictions.
7. A number of packages are available for fitting and predicting out of sample for GP models, both in R and in
a number of other programming languages and software environments including python and MATLAB. However,
no currently available software implements average marginal effects or provides posterior inference over linear mean
function coefficients.
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For example, suppose you believe the important underlying relationship between your predictors
and outcomes is in fact linear, but you also want to explicitly model and account for correlated
errors, as in Carlson (2021). Then you may use a model of the following form:


y ∼ N f (X) , σy2 I ,

(3.19)

f ∼ GP (Xβ, K (X, X)) ,

(3.20)

where your quantity of interest is β. Then it would not be useful to treat the mean function
parameters as a model selection problem; rather we want to find the distribution of those parameters
themselves instead of the distribution of f . One approach would be to place priors on the mean
function and covariance function parameters to get the posterior distribution of all the GP prior’s
hyperparameters; this approach, taken in Carlson (2021), however, generally requires MCMC
sampling, as priors on the covariance function hyperparameters generally result in the posterior
being analytically intractible.8
If the covariance function parameters are not directly of interest, however, we can set those
using Bayesian model selection as in the general prediction workflow; then, with covariance
function parameters in hand, the posterior distribution of β is

β | y, X ∼ N (β̄, Σβ ),

(3.21)

β̄ = (B −1 + XT Ky−1 X)−1 (B −1 b + XT Ky−1 y),
Σβ = (B −1 + XT Ky−1 X)−1 ,

(3.22)
(3.23)

8. A bespoke MCMC sampler for GP regression with priors on all hyperparameters is also offered in the R package,
which provides samples much faster than the general-purpose Stan implementation used for Carlson (2021).
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where b is the prior mean of β and B is the prior covariance of β.9
However, if our motivation for using a GP approach is flexibility in the form of f rather than
being interested only in posterior inference over a linear trend contained in f , we should instead
perform inference on the average marginal effect of our predictors. As this is not a task common in
the use of GP models in computer science, the machine learning literature on GP models provides
no explicit derivation for this quantity, although for other reasons, building blocks we need for it
have previously been derived.
To formalize, we want to reason about the relationship between predictors X and outcomes y,
and specifically wish to know the marginal effect of a particular predictor d, i.e., the dth feature of
X. In a parametric regression model where we assume f (X) = Xβ and simply estimate β, the
∂ f (xi )
= β̂d , ∀i. In GP regression and classification, we
marginal effect of Xd is easy to see:
∂ xid
gain a much more flexible model that allows for non-independence of observations and non-linear
mappings from X to y, but then feature d does not have a constant effect on y. We can summarize
the effect of feature d on y with the sample average marginal effect,10 which in the regression
context is defined as
N
1 X ∂ f (xi )
.
γd ,
N i=1 ∂ xid

(3.24)

For classification, γd gives us the sample average partial effect, or the sample average effect on the
latent function f , which does not directly translate to the average marginal effect on our dichotomous
outcomes y. In this case, often of more interest than γd is
N
1 X ∂ σ (f (xi ))
πd ,
,
N i
∂ xid

(3.25)

which gives the average marginal effect of predictor d on the function σ (f (X)) that gives the
probability of a positive response.
9. See Rasmussen and Williams (2006) Section 2.7. A full derivation is also offered in the appendix.
10. See Hainmueller and Hazlett (2014) for a similar approach with kernel-regularized least squares.
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Moreover, when d is discrete, instanteous change in f at our observed points is not meaningful;
then we want the average discrete change in f at levels of predictor d. For binary variables, let X∗1
be a set of test points where all feature observactions are identical to X except that all observations
of feature d have been set to 1, and analogously for X∗0 .11 Then a more appropriate quantity of
interest rather than γd is

δd ,

N
1 X
f (x∗1i ) − f (x∗0i ) ,
N i=1

(3.26)

which gives the average marginal effect on y of taking a 1 vs a 0 value in the regression case, or the
average partial effect on f of taking a 1 vs a 0 value in the classification case. For classification,
the effect on the probability scale is
N
1 X
σ (f (x∗1i )) − σ (f (x∗0i )) .
ψd ,
N i=1

(3.27)

For categorical variables, we simply find δd or ψd for all substantively interesting pairwise comparisons of levels of the categorical variable. (Often this is comparing the various categorical labels
to one “baseline” label).
Our starting point for deriving these quantities is noting that “[s]ince differentiation is a linear operator, the derivative of a Gaussian process is another Gaussian process” (Rasmussen and
Williams 2006, 191). Let



∂ f1
∂ x 
 1d 
 . 
fd =  ..  .


 ∂ fn 
∂ xnd
Using Equation 9.1 in Rasmussen and Williams (2006),
11. You can replace 1 and 0 with other binary value labels as needed.
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(3.28)


∂ k (x1 , xn )
∂ k (x1 , x1 )
...

 ∂x
∂ x1d
1d




..
..
..
Kd , C [fd , f ] = 
,
.
.
.


 ∂ k (xn , x1 )
∂ k (xn , xn ) 
...
∂ xnd
∂ xnd



∂ 2 k (x1 , xn )
∂ 2 k (x1 , x1 )
...
 ∂x ∂x
∂ x1d ∂ xnd 
1d
1d




..
..
..
, C [fd , fd ] = 
,
.
.
.


 ∂ 2 k (xn , x1 )
∂ 2 k (xn , xn ) 
...
∂ xnd ∂ x1d
∂ xnd ∂ xnd

(3.29)



Kdd

(3.30)

To make the notation more compact, as is usual we set K = K (X, X), and additionally set
µ = µ (X) and



∂ µ (x1 )
 ∂x 
1d 



..
µd = 
.
.


 ∂ µ (xn ) 
∂ xnd

(3.31)

Then we can describe the joint prior on f and fd :


  
 
T
f 
 µ   K Kd 
 ,
  ∼ N   , 
Kd Kdd
fd
µd

(3.32)

and for regression and under normal approximations of the posterior for classification,12 the posterior distribution of fd given X and y is normal with mean
12. When simulating the posterior for classification rather than using an analytical approximation, fd is normally
distributed given each f draw (with mean µd + Kd K −1 (f − µ) and variance Kdd − Kd K −1 KdT ), so fd samples can
simply be taken conditioned on the f samples.
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Z
E [fd | X, y] =

E [fd | f , X] p (f | X, y) df

= µd + Kd K −1 (E [f | X, y] − µ) ,

(3.33)

and variance



V [fd | X, y] = Kdd − Kd K −1 KdT + E (E [fd | f ] − E [fd | X, y])2

= Kdd − Kd K −1 − K −1 V [f | X, y] K −1 KdT .

(3.34)

(The full derivations for all results in this section are provided in the appendix for the interested
reader). In the regression case,

E [fd | X, y] = µd + Kd Ky−1 (y − µ) ,

(3.35)

V [fd | X, y] = Kdd − Kd Ky−1 KdT ,

(3.36)

For classification, under the Laplace approximation to the posterior,




E [fd | X, y] = µd + Kd ∇ log p y | f̂ ,
V [fd | X, y] = Kdd − Kd K + W −1

−1

KdT .

(3.37)
(3.38)

Since then γd is a constant ( 1/N ) times the sum of correlated normal random variables,
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γd ∼ N

N
N
N
1 X
1 XX
mγd i , 2
cγ ij
N i=1
N j=1 i=1 d

!
,

(3.39)

mγd = E [fd | X, y]

(3.40)

Cγd = V [fd | X, y]

(3.41)

Importantly, we may also get the average marginal effect of feature d within subgroups of X rather
than the full sample average by simply altering the indices of summation in Equation (3.39). The
distribution of δd is analogous:

δd ∼ N

N
N
N
1 XX
1 X
mδd i , 2
cδ ij
N i=1
N j=1 i=1 d

!
,

(3.42)

mδd = E [f1∗ | X, y] − E [f0∗ | X, y] ,

(3.43)

Cδd = V [f1∗ | X, y] + V [f0∗ | X, y] + C [f1∗ , f0∗ | X, y] + C [f0∗ , f1∗ | X, y] .

(3.44)

Unfortunately, the distribution πd cannot be analytically expressed, though we can readily
simulate from it. First note that
∂ σ (f (xi )) ∂ f (xi )
∂ σ (f (xi ))
=
.
∂ xid
∂f
∂ xid

(3.45)

Generally the sigmoid function σ has a known derivative; for example, in the logistic case,
∂ σ (f (xi ))
= σ (f (xi )) (1 − σ (f (xi ))) .
∂f
Since we have an approximation to the posterior on f , and given f , the posterior over fd is
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(3.46)


fd | f ∼ N µd + Kd K −1 (f − µ) , Kdd − Kd K −1 KdT ,

(3.47)

we can obtain M samples of πd by
• drawing f t from the chosen posterior approximation, such as the Laplace approximation





−1
−1
,13
N µ + K ∇ log p y | f̂ , (K + W )

• drawing fdt from N µd + Kd K −1 (f t − µ) , Kdd − Kd K −1 KdT ,
• and calculating

πdt

N
1 X ∂ σ (fit ) t
=
fid ,
N i=1 ∂ f

so that we can summarize the distribution of πd using the M draws, similar to the CLARIFY
procedure (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000). We can also similarly simulate the distribution of
ψd by simply generating values of f (X∗1 ) and f (X∗0 ) from the posterior approximation, pushing
those samples through the chosen sigmoid σ, and calculate the average of the differences to get
the average marginal effect for each sample so that we can summarize the distribution of average
marginal effects.
We can illustrate the use of average marginal effects in GP models by returning to our previous
example. For the function f (x) = 2 sin (x) + x where x ∼ U (−π, π), the true average marginal
effect of x on f (x) is 1—the oscillations cancel out and we are left with the effect of the linear
term. In other words, on average, f (x) increases with x at a rate of 1, which is often the type of
information we want to have about functions of interest as political scientists. For the dichotomous
simulated data we may also be interested in the average slope of σ (f (x)); here, the true average
marginal effect of x on σ (f (x)) is 0.146. Figure 3.3 shows the posterior means and 95% CIs for
the average marginal effects in the regression and classification cases, with linear model baselines
13. At this point, since we have resorted to simulation, it may be tempting to use ESS to draw from the posterior. This
can be done, but then we lose the ability to perform simple model selection for GP prior hyperparameters, resulting in
markedly increased computation time.
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Figure 3.3: Average marginal effect (AME) of x. The left panel shows the AME of x on f (x)
for both regression and classification; the right panel shows the AME of x on the probability of a
positive outcome in classification. The true theoretical AME is given by the dashed line in both
panels.
depicted for comparison; we can see the average marginal effect on both f (x) and σ (f (x)) is
captured well by the GP models. Even though there is a true linear trend in f and the nonlinear
deviations are designed to cancel out over the range of the simulated x values, the linear models by
contrast poorly estimate the average marginal effect of x on both the link and probability scales.

3.4

Application: Economic Voting in Presidential Elections

I now turn to an application to real-world data to demonstrate strengths of the method. Campello
and Zucco (2016) present an important finding in the literature on economic voting: Presidential
reelection prospects (in the Latin American context) are affected by economic conditions that are
unambiguously unrelated to presidents’ policies. Relying on evidence from economics “that Latin
American countries generally do well when international interest rates are low and commodity
prices are high, and are hurt when the opposite happens”, Campello and Zucco (2016) generate a
“good economic times” (GET) index that captures both international interest rates and commodity
prices (592). This should affect commodity exporting countries and countries with low savings
(since they “depend on foreign inflows of capital to foster investment and economic growth”) even
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more, so they also code for which countries are low-savings and commodity exporting (LSCE)
countries (592). Latin American presidents’ actions do not affect international interest rates or
commodity prices, so if voters’ economic voting is tied to these factors, it illustrates a failure of
economic voting to lead to electoral accountability. In presidential elections in South America from
1980 to 2012, they code the outcome of the election as “Reelected” if the incumbent ran and was
reelected, or if the incumbent’s chosen successor wins election if the incumbent doesn’t run, and
run logit models to assess the effect of the GET index. They show that an increase in the GET index
increases the probability of reelection in LSCE countries. However, analyzing their data using GP
classification yields a more nuanced story.14
Campello and Zucco (2016) report results for a few different model specifications; first they
show a basic model that includes only an interaction between the GET index and the LSCE indicator
(and the constituent terms). For this basic model, their central result holds: An increase in the GET
index improves presidential reelection prospects in LSCE countries, though the difference between
LSCE countries and non-LSCE countries is somewhat muted in the GP classification model relative
to the logit model, and the average effect size for an increase in the GET index is somewhat smaller.
Campello and Zucco (2016) report the “first difference” for the GET index for the LSCE group
of countries and for the non-LSCE countries; this is the difference in the predicted probability of
reelection when the GET index is set to its mean plus its standard deviation compared to when
the GET index is set to its mean minus its standard deviation. In Figure 3.4, I depict the GET
first differences for both the GP classification model and the logit model; they are very similar, but
the effects are slightly smaller in the GP model, and the difference between LSCE and non-LSCE
countries is not quite as pronounced.
The reason for this becomes clear if we look at how the GET index’s marginal effect varies across
its range, depicted in Figure 3.5, which illustrates one of the strengths of GP models: They do not
14. The replication data and code for Campello and Zucco (2016) are available on the Journal of Politics Dataverse
(Campello and Zucco 2015).
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Figure 3.4: Comparing GET first differences between GP classification and logit; the first difference
depicted is the sample average difference in predicted probability of reelection between setting the
GET index equal to its mean plus its standard deviation and setting it equal to its mean minus its
standard deviation, for both LSCE and non-LSCE countries, with 95% credible/confidence intervals
force a linear relationship between predictors and outcomes, but allow more flexible relationships
where they should exist. While the logit model forces a constant marginal effect, the more flexible
GP model allows the effect to vary across GET values. Keep in mind precisely what the plot is
depicting: At every GET value, it shows the instantaneous rate of change for an increase to the GET
index. So, what we see is interesting, but quite sensible once the model is able to illuminate the
relationship. For very negative values of the GET index, an increase does not change much, but the
effect grows as we reach more moderate values, and eventually wanes at extreme positive values,
which makes perfect sense: When times are very good, it can be hard to distinguish between small
increases.
We can further visualize this result by looking at the predicted probability of reelection as the
GET index varies, depicted in Figure 3.6; as the index increases, initially there is a sharp increase
in probability of reelection which then flattens off at more extreme values for the GP model. So,
for their basic model, the result is well in keeping with the argument and conclusions of Campello
and Zucco (2016), but provides a nice nuance to the story.
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Figure 3.5: Marginal effect of an increase to the GET index across its observed range. Effects are
on the link scale; 95% credible bands depicted with shading.
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Figure 3.6: Comparing predicted probabilities between GP classification and logit, computed across
the range of the GET index setting the LSCE indicator to 1 and to 0, with 95% credible/confidence
bands
However, they also estimate models with controls. Specifically, they estimate a model that
controls for whether the incumbent seeks reelection. In the South American context, this is
important because “Incumbent presidents running for reelection in Latin America rarely lose an
election” (Campello and Zucco 2016, 595), so we should see an overall higher probability of
reelection for the incumbent group. When we add this control to the GP classification model, the
sample average marginal effect of the GET index is no longer reliably positive (mean: 0.27; 95%
credible interval: [-0.08, 0.61]), even when focusing on the LSCE group alone (mean: 0.26; 95%
credible interval: [-0.08, 0.60]). The reason for this becomes clear when we look at the marginal
effect of the GET index separately for the incumbent and non-incumbent groups, depicted in Figure
3.7: The GP model is able to uncover an interactive effect between incumbency and the GET index!
From the standpoint of democratic accountability, this makes sense; even if good economic times
exerts an irrational influence on voters’ evaluations of the parties/candidates, when incumbents
themselves are up for reelection, the voters have much more specific information on what the
incumbent will do and what effects that will have, which could mute the more irrational effect of
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Figure 3.7: Marginal effect of an increase to the GET index across its observed range when
incumbency is controlled for. Effects are on the link scale; 95% credible bands are depicted with
shading and 80% credible bands are depicted with dashed lines.
generally good economic times. In the context of Latin American elections specifically, another
factor that may support an interactive effect is just how heavily favored incumbents are—they are
almost universally reelected; it may be that the effect of incumbency so drowns out all other factors
in the voters’ decision making process that they do not consider the things the GET index represents.
Thus the GP classification model was once again able to guard against misspecification bias, this
time through uncovering an interactive effect the original researchers did not account for. Again,
this moderates the story originally told in Campello and Zucco (2016) and provides more nuance.
Notice in the left panel of Figure 3.7 that in the non-incumbent group, the marginal effect of the
GET index is estimated to be positive across its range, and though it is not statistically reliable at
the 95% level, for moderate values of the index, the 80% credible interval does not contain zero,
providing (admittedly weak) evidence that the mechanism Campello and Zucco (2016) propose
may be at play when incumbents do not run. At the least it suggests more work should be done in
this area to determine if we can uncover a statistically reliable effect with broader data; these data
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contain only 106 observations, so a higher powered study may be needed to detect a reliable effect
when accounting for this interaction.15

3.5

Benefits of GP Models for the Study of Judicial Politics

One area where using GP models can be particularly useful is judicial politics. An important
concept in judicial politics is legal doctrine, or the policy rules pronounced by judges. Judicial
scholars often incorporate some aspect of doctrine, either as an outcome (for example, studying
legal change as in Wahlbeck 1997) or as (a) predictor(s) of interest or control(s) (for example,
studying legal constraint as in Bartels 2009). One way to conceptualize legal rules or doctrine is a
mapping from real-world circumstances to outcomes that judges would dictate in a case presented
to them with those circumstances. However, as noted by Kastellec (2010), using models with strong
functional form assumptions, particularly generalized linear models, inappropriately restricts our
estimation of that mapping.
To make this clear, let’s consider a concrete example using a common type of legal rule, called a
“conjunctive rule”, where all elements of the rule must be met for a positive outcome, such as a law
facing strict scrutiny analysis. For a law to pass constitutional muster under a strict scrutiny test, it
must both serve a compelling governmental interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.
Such a rule is depicted in Figure 3.8. The x-axis captures whether the governmental interest is
“compelling”; the axis is reverse coded, such that low values indicate a compelling interest and
high values indicate an interest that is less than compelling. The y-axis is for the broadness of the
regulation at issue; low values indicate a narrowly tailored regulation and high values a regulation
that is not narrowly tailored.
Taking each dimensions as being a continuum from 0 to 1, with 0.5 being the threshold on
15. At a conventional power level of 0.8, we would need at least 144 observations (a sample size increase of 35.8%)
to detect an effect of the size seen in the basic model at the 0.05 significance level once accounting for the interactive
effect of incumbency and the GET index.
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Figure 3.8: Comparing estimation of legal rules between linear models and GP classification. In
panel (a), the true strict scrutiny test is depicted with the set of cases receiving a “constitutional”
outcome indicated with gray shading. In panels (b) and (c), estimates of the rule from a logit
model and GP classifier respectively are depicted with gray shading. In those panels the true rule
is indicated with a dashed line, and the simulated cases the models were trained on are indicated
with light gray crosses.
each dimension for meeting that element of the strict scrutiny test, I simulated 250 cases, drawing
the case factors independently from a standard uniform distribution for each case. I assigned them
outcomes according to the rule that a “constitutional” outcome should be given if and only if both
broadness and inverse interest were less than 0.5. I then trained both a logit model (the standard
approach in prior literature) and a GP classifier on these cases. I then determined the set of cases
each model would assign a “constitutional” outcome to, and compared these estimated rules to the
true strict scrutiny test; the results are depicted in Figure 3.8.
While the linear model struggled to find the relationship legal doctrine dictates between states of
the world and outcomes, the GP classifier was able to very closely approximate the true legal rule.
When studying legal rules, non-parametric models such as GP classification should be strongly
encouraged.
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3.6

Conclusion

Political scientists commonly face uncertainty over functional form in their models or issues of
error correlation. Sometimes assuming a linear functional form masks systematic deviations from
linearity in the true relationship between our predictor of interest and our outcomes. We may also
fail to specify all necessary interactive effects in our model specifications. GP models solve both of
these misspecification bias pitfalls, and are more flexible and extensible than other approaches to
alleviating misspecification bias such as Hainmueller and Hazlett (2014) (which does not cover, for
example, binary outcomes). Carlson (2021) shows GP regression is even more adept at handling
error correlation in time series cross-sectional data than bespoke solutions such as panel-corrected
standard errors or lagged dependent variable or fixed effect approaches.
I offer a thorough introduction to GP models for political scientists, and expand the state of the art
for these models to provide the distribution of inferential quantities of interest to political scientists
that the machine learning literature does not cover. I provide both simulation and replication
evidence of the usefulness of GP models as well as practical guidance on performing inference
with these models that are increasingly gaining popularity with political scientists.
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Chapter 4
The Force of the Law: The Constraining
Effect of Precedent at the US Supreme
Court
A fundamental question at the heart of judicial politics is whether, how, and to what extent
“law” impacts judges’ decisions.1 Judges often profess to simply apply existing law to the cases
before them, untainted by their own preferences, exemplified by Chief Justice Roberts’ (in)famous
statement, “Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them. . . I will
decide every case based on the record, according to the rule of law. . . and I will remember that
it’s my job to call balls and strikes, and not to pitch or bat.” Nevertheless, judges are typically
portrayed as conservative or as liberal just as other political actors are, and with good reason: A
long line of political science research finds ideology to be a strong predictor of US Supreme Court
justices’ decisions (e.g. Epstein and Knight 1998; Segal and Spaeth 2002) and media coverage may
highlight political or negative aspects of the Court’s decisions (Denison, Wedeking, and Zilis 2020;
Johnson and Socker 2012).
1. A previous version of this paper was presented at the 2021 annual conference of the American Political Science
Association. I would like to thank Jim Spriggs, Jacob Montgomery, and Jongyoon Baik for their helpful comments.
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Although the public need not view judges as “legal automatons” to view the courts as legitimate
(Gibson and Caldeira 2011), to the extent judges are viewed as mere “politicians in robes”, the
courts’ legitimacy may suffer. More fundamentally, understanding the way legal constraint interacts
with political ideology in judicial decision making is crucial for generating useful theories of judicial
behavior and accurate inferences in quantitative studies of judicial politics. Given the stakes for
understanding the extent to which the law constrains judicial decision making, it is no surprise
the literature offers a variety of clever ways to test for the law’s influence, such as examining
the behavior of dissenting justices in future related cases (Segal and Spaeth 1996), studying the
use of precedent (Hansford and Spriggs 2006; Hinkle 2015), considering legal forces particular
to agenda-setting decisions (Black and Owens 2009), interacting legal and ideological variables
to find conditional effects (Bartels 2009, 2011), and isolating ideological effects by considering
positions taken by political actors outside the Court (Bailey and Maltzman 2008).
While the political science literature is unambiguous that ideology plays a large role at the
Court, the evidence on what constraining effect, if any, the law exerts on the justices’ decisions is
mixed. Segal and Spaeth (2002) posited Supreme Court justices as more or less unconstrained by
law, deciding cases as they like, but other scholars advocate a more nuanced view, with effects of
ideology as well as constraint of ideological behavior by legal factors (e.g. Bartels 2009). Even
some work that concludes that “law matters” finds that legal constraint is not among the chief legal
effects; for example, Hansford and Spriggs (2006) conclude that law (that is, precedent) can act as
both an opportunity (to interpret existing precedent positively or negatively in line with their own
ideological preferences) in addition to a constraint—but the weight of their presented evidence is
on the side of law as opportunity rather than constraint.
Perhaps because constraining effects of law are difficult to uncover in Supreme Court justices’
ultimate decisions on the merits, work on this topic often focuses on slightly different effects or
settings. For example, Bailey and Maltzman (2008) estimate justices’ willingness to explicitly
overrule precedent, controlling for justices’ preferences by using positions taken on Supreme Court
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cases by members of Congress and the president.2 Black and Owens (2009) show factors such as
circuit conflicts predict agenda-setting decisions at the Supreme Court, controlling for whether the
justices would ideologically prefer to grant or deny cert given the status quo from the lower court
decision. Hinkle (2015) finds Circuit Court judges are more likely to cite precedent that is binding
in their jurisdiction, utilizing random panel assignment at the U.S. Courts of Appeals to identify
the effect.
Moreover, even when empirical studies uncover constraining effects of law, methodological
critiques cloud the findings. For example, Richards and Kritzer (2002) find evidence of “jurisprudential regimes”: When a (typically landmark) decision dictates an important change to how certain
facts are treated under the law, their work suggests justices seem to vote differently afterward, suggesting these precedents exert some binding force on the justices’ choices. However, Lax and Rader
(2010a) show that work in this area failed to account for crucial forms of error correlation, such
as by term, resulting in overconfident statistical tests. Some work, such as Bartels (2009), has
used mutli-level modeling to account for this issue, though we may still worry about “parametric
assumptions of error distributions” since we “must assume what sort of clustering can exist [and]
assume that other forms. . . do not exist” (Lax and Rader 2010b, 289). A particularly difficult
problem for inference in this area is a type of time-varying confounding: as a justice serves on the
Court, their preferences influence the law, so finding an impact of “law” on the justice’s decisions
may just be picking up on agreement with their own past selves. Some work, such as Segal and
Spaeth (1996), focuses on the actions of dissenters in future related cases for this reason, finding
little constraining effect of the law.
I provide a novel examination of this issue by using Gaussian process (GP) classification, a
machine learning technique, to measure the law and its effect on justices’ decisions. I conceptualize
the law as the implication in a particular case from all the cases that came before it; given the outcome
2. Bailey and Maltzman (2008) also look at two other legal effects: Whether the justices exhibit “judicial restraint”—
i.e., defers to Congress—and whether they adhere to a strict interpretation of the First Amendment.
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the Court has assigned to similar cases in the past, what should we think about this case if we did
not let anything else influence our thinking? I operationalize this as the predicted outcome in the
present case given its facts from a GP classification model trained only on the cases that came before
it. This approach aligns more closely than past empirical approaches with the process typically
identified as legal reasoning: determining how the present case, as a whole, relates to the Court’s
past decisions (Levi 1949). It provides a single variable whose effect in justice-level models will
give the impact of the law on their decisions. This contrasts with approaches in traditional case
fact studies, such as Richards and Kritzer (2002) and Bartels (2009), who look at the effect of a
particular (set of) legally relevant case fact(s), where I instead look at the effect of the implied legal
outcome given all the legally relevant case facts on justices’ individual decisions. Importantly, I
show how to control for justices’ own contribution to the current state of the law to properly identify
the impact of the current state of precedent on justices’ individual decisions, independent of their
own preferences, addressing the time-varying confounding issue. I find ample effects of ideological
and policy preferences, but also that law provides a significant and substantial effect on Supreme
Court decision making, for some justices more than others.
This study provides several main contributions. First, I provide a fresh theoretical perspective
on legal constraint by conceptualizing the law as the implied outcome in each case given the cases
that came before it. Second, I overcome methodological issues with past studies to provide the
best available evidence that the law exerts a constraining force on the actions of (some) justices.
Third, I provide a new measure of the law, or of the legal status quo. This new measure can help
reinvigorate studies of legal constraint and modeling law at the Court, as the volume of work on this
important issue has diminished in part because some think the justices are largely unconstrained,
but also due to difficult methodological issues (see, e.g., Klein 2017). A measure of the legal status
quo is also an important quantity in a number of contexts judicial politics researchers face (see, e.g.,
Black and Owens 2009) just as a status quo is important in many areas of political science more
broadly (e.g. Krehbiel 1998). I also provide suggestive evidence differentiating between reasons
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why the law matters, indicating some justices have a preference for following the law rather than
seeing it as a constraint due to (for example) legitimacy needs, which few studies have attempted.
Finally, I highlight a widespread mismatch between theory and methods in judicial politics and
show how to apply a method better suited to studying decision making in the setting of adjudication.
By restricting attention to linear models, past work was susceptible to misspecification bias (see
Kastellec 2010), while the modeling strategy taken here avoids that issue while more closely
matching the concept of legal reasoning. In so doing, I offer the most compelling evidence to date
of how law constraints Supreme Court Justices’ decisions.

4.1

Measuring the Law

Part of the difficulty in studying this issue is one of measurement; how do you measure the law in a
way to facilitate analyzing its constraint on justices’ decisions? A number of clever approaches to
measuring the law have been utilized. For example, the law can be conceptualized as a collection
of precedents; Hansford and Spriggs (2006) use this idea, and analyze citations to those precedents
to assess legal change. Bailey and Maltzman (2008) measure justices’ willingness to overrule past
precedent as a measure of legal constraint. Bartels (2009) interacts Martin-Quinn scores (Martin
and Quinn 2002)3 with legally relevant case facts to determine if facts constrain the effect of
ideology, and in particular to determine whether some types of cases provide more constraint on
ideology than others.
However, lack of a measure of what outcome the law implies in each case has led some to
feel “we have reached a point of rapidly diminishing returns in our study of [the] issue” of legal
constraint, though with perhaps some hope that advances in text analysis methods may provide
better measurement tools (Klein 2017). I provide a different approach: Joining Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes in claiming, “the prophecies of what the courts will do . . . are what I mean by the
3. Martin-Quinn scores provide ideological estimates for Supreme Court justices somewhat analogous to (e.g.)
NOMINATE scores (Poole and Rosenthal 1985) for members of Congress.
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law” (Holmes 1897), I propose estimating a predictive mapping between case characteristics and
legal outcomes as a measure of “the law.” That is, for each case, we place ourselves in the shoes of
a decision maker at the time the case was decided, and say “the law” in that case is what our best
predicted outcome in the case would be if we examined only the past decisions of the Court at the
time.
This conception matches a number of theoretical perspectives on the law, judicially-created
policy, and judicial decision making. Consider the attitudinal model, which posits that judges make
decisions based on the characteristics of the cases presented to them and their own sincere attitudes
and values. Holmes’ legal realist approach comports well with this approach. “Case space” models
(Lax 2011) can be considered a formalization of the attitudinal model; judges’ policy preferences
in these models are a partition of a case space, where each dimension corresponds to a case fact,
into outcomes. Lax (2007) shows how to represent judicial policy-making using such models. My
predictive approach can be viewed as a Bayesian update after each case as to the mapping from the
case space to outcomes, or an online update about the justices’ attitudes.
This approach can also comport with a legal model of judicial decision making; Levi (1949)
explains that in legal analysis, factually similar cases should receive similar outcomes. So this is
exactly how law students learn and how lawyers typically argue cases, and how judges would make
decisions under the legal model: We take all past cases of the Court, compare the present case
to those cases, and assign it the outcome implied by the cases most similar to the present case.
Callander and Clark (2017) show how to extend case space models so that the case space maps
onto a continuous latent legal outcome rather than onto discrete dispositions; under an assumption
that the high court has perfect knowledge of the “correct” mapping from the case space to legal
outcomes, lower courts update their knowledge of that mapping after every observed decision of the
high court by comparing similarity of the cases they are presented with the past observed decisions
of the high court.
Thus, I use the following approach to measure the law: Let X ⊂ Rn be the n case factors
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relevant in the area of law at issue and X be a finite number of observed cases from the space X;
for each case i, we estimate the mapping between the characteristics Xi−1 of all cases observed
prior to i and outcomes yi−1 in those cases, so that “the law” is the outcome predicted from that
model given the characteristics of the instant case, xi .
There is a long history in the study of judicial politics of estimating the relationship between case
characteristics and Court decisions. For example, in the context of Fourth Amendment challenges
to police searches and seizures, Segal (1984) shows the relationship between case facts such as
the existence of probable cause and the Court’s decisions. However, scholars have stopped short
of using such models to develop measures of the law. In addition to this innovation, I also use
GP classification for estimating this mapping rather than a generalized linear model, as in, e.g.,
Segal (1984). I use this model because it flows naturally from my conception of law here: The
GP classifier is a nonparametric model that compares the test case to all training cases on the basis
of all combinations of predictors. That is, a judge hearing a case is not so concerned with any
particular fact in isolation. Instead, they care about how the facts as a collective bundle affect the
legal outcome; the effect of one fact almost always depends on the presence or absence of other
facts. Therefore a linear model unreasonably constrains the class of legal rules we can recover from
observed cases (see Kastellec 2010), resulting in misspecification bias. GP classification allows
us to uncover any smooth function mapping case characteristics to legal outcomes, as explained in
Section 4.3.2, and provides a convenient way to separate out the effects of this predictor and judges’
own preferences as explained in Section 4.3.3.

4.2

Modeling Judges’ Decisions

I start from the assumptions of an attitudinal model or the case space model (Kornhauser 1992)4.
For any issue area, or type of case (e.g. cases about police searches and seizures), a judge has
4. See Lax (2011) for an overview of case space models in political science.
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a number of factors relevant to their preferred outcome. For example, in a police search case, a
judge’s preferred outcome (i.e., whether they prefer to rule that the search was constitutional or
unconstitutional) may be influenced by whether the search was of a home or not, or if the search
was incident to arrest; these case factors may interact in potentially complex ways to determine
the judge’s sincerely preferred outcome. However, we also must take into account that judges may
not follow their own preferred dispositions precisely; they may feel constrained by “the law”. For
example, suppose a judge would always prefer to rule that searches of a home require a warrant
to be lawful. However, they have also observed the Supreme Court’s ruling in Maryland v. Buie
(1990)5 that officers may sweep the area during an in-home arrest to uncover hidden persons who
could pose a danger to those at the scene. This judge may—or may not—then feel constrained to
rule differently from their preferred disposition in a closely related case.
To formalize this idea, let φj represent judge j’s sincere policy preferences; in other words, φj
is a function that maps X to outcomes. Now, Supreme Court justices are likely less concerned with
the outcome in any particular case they hear than broader issues of how the law is interpreted, so it
may seem awkward to define judicial preferences in this way. However, think about the implications
of a case outcome in light of the discussion in the previous section; every time the Supreme Court
puts out a new decision, it clarifies their interpretation of the mapping between X and y. That
is, the justices’ utility from deciding a case one way or another may come in part from preferring
a particular party wins the case, but it also provides a vehicle for updating observers on judicial
policy. Let λ represent the Court’s mapping from X to y, or the association between cases in X
and the outcomes that would result from majority voting over outcomes among the justices on the

Court. λi will indicate the outcome implied in case i from the prior cases Di−1 = Xi−1 , yi−1 .
Then each justice j’s overall preferences fj are a function both of λ and of φj .
For example, let’s revisit the Buie case mentioned above. An armed robber was described as
wearing a red track suit. The police obtained a warrant for Buie, and executed it at his home.
5. 494 U.S. 325.
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An officer coaxed Buie out of the basement and arrested him. Another officer then “entered the
basement ‘in case there was someone else’ down there”, at which point he found a red track suit in
the basement. Buie argued the red track suit should be excluded as evidence. There are a number of
prior decisions of the Court in Di−1 that influence our estimate of λi , or the legal outcome. In Terry
v. Ohio (1968)6, the Court ruled officers can “stop and frisk” an individual without violating the
Fourth Amendment if they have reasonable suspicion the person is armed and thus presents a threat
to the officers. In Michigan v. Tyler (1978)7, the Court held government actors may seize evidence
of a crime if it is in “plain view” from a place they were allowed to be in. Thus our estimate of
λi may well be that the law implies a ruling that the track suit was legally seized, since the officer
suspected “someone else” (who could pose a danger to the officers at the scene) was “down there”
in the basement where he found the track suit in “plain view”. The sincere preferences φj of judge
j may be to rule it was a constitutional seizure or an unconstitutional one.
It will be useful to consider λ to be a mapping from cases to continuous outcomes rather than
dichotomous ones. Judges must assign a dichotomous outcome to each case (government action
is constitutional or unconstitutional; or the plaintiff wins or defendant wins, etc.), but some cases
are a “closer call” than others. Then with some function σ mapping R to [0, 1], which I will take
to be the logistic function,8 σ (λi ) gives the probability case i should receive a positive outcome.
Cases with large positive λi are cases where we are quite certain the case should receive a positive
outcome, while cases with large negative λi are cases where we have high confidence the case
should receive a negative outcome; cases with λi close to zero are “close calls”.
Approaches to model or account for judicial preferences in models of case adjudication differ.
6. 392 U.S. 1.
7. 436 U.S. 499. The plain view doctrine relied on in Tyler was first articulated by the Court in Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), though in that case the Court described it only to state the facts of Coolidge did not
meet the requirements of the plain view doctrine. In Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990), decided the same term
as Buie, the Court held that does not even matter if the discovery of the evidence “in plain view” was inadvertent or
not.
8. I will assume the use of the logistic function throughout the paper, but a number of other functions such as the
normal cumulative distribution function could be used.
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Case space models typically concern themselves only with φj , and how judges act strategically to
enact their preferences within particular institutional arrangements or strategic situations. Bartels
(2009) instead focused on controlling for legal effects via λ and capturing judicial preferences via
Martin-Quinn scores. Here I focus on accounting for the fuller picture of judicial preferences φj
and utilizing λ as the predictor of interest to capture the effect of the law on judicial preferences.
That is, the judges’ sincere preferences in these cases are not wholly captured by a unidimensional
measure such as Martin-Quinn scores. The Martin-Quinn measure is useful as an overall measure of
ideology, but issue-specific preferences are best described with reference to the case space defined
by the relevant facts in such cases. However, the law, which we must measure or operationalize
in some way to assess legal constraint, is also best described as a mapping between this space and
outcomes.
Separating out these effects—the pull toward a particular vote from the judge’s individually
truly preferred outcome given the characteristics of the present case and the pull from the outcome
implied by the Court’s past decisions given the characteristics of the present case—is non-trivial.
We cannot observe the justices’ sincere policy preferences φj , and both φj and λ are themselves
functions of the same case factors X.
However, there are some things we can say even with such a general theoretical setup. First,
consider our quantity of interest is the average marginal effect of the law, or how much, on average,
λ influences a justice’s decision; considering all the cases this justice has heard, how much on
average would the value of fj change with an increase in λ (i.e. with an increase in the probability
that the law says the outcome should go a particular way)? This average marginal effect is by
definition
N
1 X ∂
fj (xi ) .
γj =
N i=1 ∂λi

(4.1)

Next, if the law exerts no constraining effect on judges’ decisions, then fj = φj . This implies
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that typically we should see an average effect of 0 if judges’ behavior is unconstrained, or an average
positive effect if the law is constraining their behavior.
Could λ have an average negative effect on fj ? Let’s consider a basic sequential game where
the justices are voting on cases one by one (as we see in reality). Absent legal constraint, under
a wide variety of assumptions about preferences, it is a weakly dominant strategy for justices to
always vote precisely in line with their preferences.9 That is, no matter how the other justices are
voting, if justice j votes how they would sincerely prefer, they can only make the outcome they
prefer more likely rather than less, and further, their preferred outcome occurring in that case can
only make the law get closer to their preferred policy rather than farther away.
In other words, in no circumstances will such a vote cause λ to deviate further from φj than
it would given a contrary vote, and in some circumstances—when j would be a pivotal vote in a
majority coalition—it will cause λ to come more into line with φj . So when j might be pivotal,
if j is not constrained by law, they are strictly better off by voting their preferences. However,
when there is no chance for j to be pivotal, they are indifferent between votes except perhaps
for expressive reasons. If we assume some noise or imperfection in a judge’s actions10, this can
result in a negative relationship between λ and fj since then her expressive motivations break her
indifference more often in more extreme cases (in terms of the difference between λ and φj ).
It is also important to note that in the applied (empirical) setting, where we cannot directly
observe φj , and may not even be certain about all its inputs, omitted variable bias could bias our
estimate of γ—if some factor Z in truth is an input to both λ and φj , but is not included in the
statistical model, we may see a spurious (positive or negative) effect. However, if this relationship is
only seen in non-pivotal votes, it provides at least suggestive evidence that an expressive mechanism
is at play rather than omitted variable bias.
We may also consider different reasons why the law would enter into judges’ decisions. From
9. See Proposition 5 in Lax (2007).
10. Or perhaps we may assume some imperfect knowledge of their own preferences; sometimes judges might be
confronted with a “hard case”.
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one perspective, judges may allow the law to influence their decisions contrary to their personal
policy preferences because they also intrinsically care about the law itself. That is, they have
both individual policy preferences, but also some preference for deciding cases consistent with the
Court’s past decisions (and these things may sometimes conflict). However, we may also think that
judges only allow the law to constrain their decisions because they do not want to be seen as going
against the law, perhaps for institutional legitimacy reasons. Bartels (2009) and Bartels (2011)
suggest certain legal factors constrain ideological voting by judges more than others. In particular,
Bartels (2009) finds that ideology influences Supreme Court justices’ votes to a greater degree in
cases involving “intermediate scrutiny” than in cases involving either a “rational basis” or “strict
scrutiny” test. In the latter two cases, legal doctrine strongly suggests the correct legal outcome
should likely be a ruling that government action is constitutional and unconstitutional respectively,
while there is much more variation in the implied legal outcome for intermediate scrutiny cases.
In the context of the model of judicial decision making considered here, when the absolute value
of λ is higher, the implied legal outcome is more certain; large positive values of λ indicate a
high probability the present case should, legally speaking, receive a positive outcome while large
negative values indicate a high probability the present case should receive a negative outcome.
When the absolute value of λ is close to zero, there is a roughly 0.5 probability that either outcome
is legally correct. So if judges have some intrinsic concern for following the law, the effect of λ
should be more or less constant over the range of λ values, whereas if the mechanism argued for
in Bartels (2009) drives law’s constraining effect, then the effect of λ should be high when the
absolute value of λ is high, but lower when λ is closer to zero.
In sum,
1. If γj > 0, it implies the law exerts some positive constraining effect on j’s decision making.
2. If γj = 0, then j’s decisions are not constrained by the law and they act only according to
their own preferences φj .
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3. If γj < 0, we should expect the negative relationship between λ and fj to exist only in cases
where j is unlikely to be a pivotal justice.
4. If γj is increasing in |λ|, it implies j follows the law only when the legal outcome is more
certain (offering less ideological discretion), whereas if γj is constant across |λ|, j may have
some intrinsic concern for following the law.

4.3

Data and Methods

To assess legal constraint at the Supreme Court, I will utilize both court- and justice-level data on
case dispositions. A court-level model provides predicted values to serve the role of λ in Section
4.2; at both levels I use Gaussian process (GP) classification, a method described further in Section
4.3.2.

4.3.1

Data

I use data on First Amendment Free Expression cases at the U.S. Supreme Court. This setting has
been frequently studied, both in the context of studying legal change (Richards and Kritzer 2002;
Bartels and O’Geen 2015) as well as studying legal constraint (Bartels 2009) as here. Richards
and Kritzer (2002) original coded the facts of all Free Expression cases heard by the Supreme
Court in the 1953 to 1998 terms, and Bartels and O’Geen (2015) backdated and updated this data
to include cases from the 1946 to 2004 terms.11 I updated this data to include cases from the
1946 to 2019 terms (adding the cases from the 15 most recent terms). These free expression cases
are coded for: whether the court-level outcome was liberal (i.e., pro-expression) or conservative
(i.e., anti-expression), measures of the facts of each case (discussed further below), and the median
Martin-Quinn score (Martin and Quinn 2002) for the Court at the time of that decision.12 I use
11. The data for Bartels and O’Geen (2015) are published as Bartels and O’Geen (2014).
12. As Martin and Quinn (2005) explain, despite the tautological issue of “votes explaining votes”, use of MartinQuinn scores as explanatory variables is appropriate when the votes in question are only from one issue area (see also
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the justice-level Supreme Court Database (Spaeth et al. 2020) and the justice-level Martin-Quinn
score data (Martin and Quinn 2020) to expand the data to the justice level. The relevant case facts
in Free Expression cases are: the Category of restriction, or whether the restriction on speech
is content-based, content-neutral, or of a less protected category of speech; the Actor, or who is
restricting speech, such as the federal government, a state government, or a private actor; what
the Restriction is, such as a criminal sanction or a loss of employment; and the Identity of the
speaker, such as whether they are a politician, an alleged communist, or a racial minority (Bartels
and O’Geen 2015). After merging records, there are 677 court-level outcomes to analyze and 5,922
justice-level votes to analyze.13

4.3.2

Gaussian process classification

Gaussian process (GP) models are a class of flexible machine learning models (Rasmussen and
Williams 2006) that political scientists have recently begun to utilize (Carlson 2021; Duck-Mayr,
Garnett, and Montgomery 2020; Gill 2021).14 Chapter 3 provides a fuller introduction to the
method, but I briefly refresh that introduction here.
GP models are used to learn the mapping from predictors to outcomes when its functional
form is unknown. Think back to my discussion in Section 4.2 of what the law might imply in the
Buie case. I did not have to specify some linear relationship between individual relevant facts and
outcomes, or even tell you anything about the shape of the relationship between X and y; I told
you about the cases that were close to Buie in X and what their outcomes were, which gave you
some idea of what the legal outcome would be in Buie. That is essentially what GP models do:
They learn about what the outcome should be in our test cases by assuming it will be similar to the
Bartels 2009).
13. There are 6,076 justice-decision combinations, but sometimes justices do not participate in a particular case
(such as for ethical reasons, or because arguments were given before they joined the Court), leaving 5,922 observations
remaining after accounting for missingness in the outcome.
14. They share some similarities to the kernel-regulated least squares model introduced by Hainmueller and Hazlett
(2014), but are more versatile, accommodating categorical outcomes, as well as a variety of kernels, and providing a
Bayesian approach (see Cheng et al. 2019).
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outcome in the cases that are closest in the covariate space. That GP models can accommodate a
wide variety of “shapes” is of particular interest in the context of judicial politics; Kastellec (2010)
rightly points out that linear models often used to relate case factors to case outcomes are too
inflexible to accommodate many common types of legal rules.
To see this, recall the example from Chapter 3, in Section 3.5. This example uses a common
type of legal rule, called a “conjunctive rule”, to illustrate the issue. For a conjunctive rule, all
elements of the rule must be met for a positive outcome. One example is the “strict scrutiny” test;
for a law to pass constitutional muster under a strict scrutiny test, it must both serve a compelling
governmental interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. A strict scrutiny rule is
depicted in Figure 4.1.15. The x-axis captures whether the governmental interest is “compelling”;
the axis is reverse coded, such that low values indicate a compelling interest and high values indicate
an interest that is less than compelling. The y-axis is for the broadness of the regulation at issue;
low values indicate a narrowly tailored regulation and high values a regulation that is not narrowly
tailored.
Taking each dimensions as being a continuum from 0 to 1, with 0.5 being the threshold on
each dimension for meeting that element of the strict scrutiny test, I simulated 250 cases, drawing
the case factors independently from a standard uniform distribution for each case. I assigned them
outcomes according to the rule that a “constitutional” outcome should be given if and only if both
broadness and inverse interest were less than 0.5. I then trained both a logit model (the standard
approach in prior literature) and a GP classifier on these cases. I then determined the set of cases
each model would assign a “constitutional” outcome to, and compared these estimated rules to the
true strict scrutiny test; the results are depicted in Figure 4.1.
The GP classifier is able to develop a much more accurate estimate of rules such as the
conjunctive rule in Figure 4.1.16 This is accomplished by making less restrictive assumptions.
15. This figure is a replication of Figure 3.8
16. To be more specific, using a linear model is equivalent to the very restrictive assumption that judges’ preferred
rules must be a hyperplane in the case space.

66

Broadness

Broadness

Broadness

(Inverse) interest

(Inverse) interest

(a) True strict scrutiny test

(b) Logit estimate

(Inverse) interest

(c) GP classification estimate

Figure 4.1: Comparing estimation of legal rules between linear models and GP classification. In
panel (a), the true strict scrutiny test is depicted with the set of cases receiving a “constitutional”
outcome indicated with gray shading. In panels (b) and (c), estimates of the rule from a logit
model and GP classifier respectively are depicted with gray shading. In those panels the true rule
is indicated with a dashed line, and the simulated cases the models were trained on are indicated
with light gray crosses.
GP classifiers typically only make some (usually fairly minimal) assumptions about the covariance
between outcomes conditional on the predictors. Then Bayes rule combined with some linear
algebra allows us to derive a posterior distribution. More specifically, the model uses a logistic
likelihood as in a typical logit model,

Pr (y | X) =

Y

σ (yi f (xi )) ,

(4.2)

i

(where σ is the logistic function). However, rather than assuming a linear (or any particular) form
for f , we simply put a prior distribution on the latent outcomes,

f (X) ∼ N (0, K (X, X)) ,

(4.3)

where K is a matrix-valued function whose i, j entry gives the prior covariance between latent
outcomes for observations i and j.17 An overwhelmingly popular choice for K, which I use in this
17. Technically this prior distribution need not have a zero mean either; see Chapter 3 for more details.
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article, is the squared exponential covariance function,

K (xi , xj , σf , `) = σf2 exp −0.5

X (xid − xjd )2
d

`2d

!
,

(4.4)

where σf is a scaling factor for the covariance matrix and ` is a vector of length scales. Essentially,
the assumption of the model here is simply that X observations that are closer together in the
covariate space will be more likely to have latent outcomes that are close together; ` basically
tells us what “close” means on each dimension. From this simple assumption, the posterior over
f —in other words, an update of our belief about what sort of relationship there is between X and y
after observing some data—can actually be quite easily approximated with a Taylor expansion (for
details, see Chapter 3).
This posterior, to return back to the notation of our specific context, is referred to above as λ
from the court-level model. In Chapter 3 I also derive average marginal effects for GP models,
which I use to calculate γ, the ultimate quantity of interest.

4.3.3

Identification

I am interested in determining the extent to which the decisions of the justices on the United States
Supreme Court are influence by the law, or the latent legal outcome implied by the Court’s past
decisions. As discussed above, this conception of the law clearly implies a measure of the law:
the prediction in case i given its characteristics xi from a model trained only on the Court’s cases
1, . . . , i − 1, denoted by λ, or λi in case i. However, I am more specifically interested in the effect
of the law on justices’ decisions, independent of the justices’ own preferences φ over outcomes.
Case characteristics can influence justice j’s decisions not only through the law, but also through
their own preferred mapping from case characteristics to outcomes. However, we cannot directly
observe φj , so we must include in our model of justice j’s decisions not only λ, but also X itself.
But, moreover, we must account for the fact that justice j’s decisions also have the potential to
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dynamically impact our variable of interest, λ. This issue becomes clearer by considering the
directed acyclic graph for the influences on justices’ decisions.
λ1

λ2

y1

x1

y2

x2

φ1

φ2

Figure 4.2: Directed acyclic graph for the influence on a justice’s decisions. xi denotes the facts of
case i, yi denotes the justice’s decision in case i, λi denotes the predicted legal outcome in case i,
and φi represents the justice’s policy preferences in case i.
We want to estimate the influence of the law on justices decisions; in Figure 4.2, this is
represented by the arrows from λi , the predicted legal outcome in case i to yi , the justice’s decision
in case i. However, this relationship can be confounded by the justice’s own policy preferences
that get “baked in” to the law when they are a part of the majority coalition in a case; in Figure
4.2, this is represented by the dashed arrow from yi to λi+1 . This line is dashed to illustrate that
it is a potential pathway;18 the justice’s preferences only become part of the law if they are in the
majority coalition. If we do not block these dashed pathways, when they are active, our estimate
of the effect of λ may be biased19 by the justice’s mere agreement with their own past self rather
than acquiescence to the law. So, consider the sequence of events. In case 1, controlling for x1 is
sufficient to identify the effect of λ1 ; then λ1 has no path to y1 through x1 and φ1 . However, in case
2, if the justice was part of case 1’s majority coalition, controlling for x2 is no longer sufficient; a
18. Technically in a DAG all pathways are considered potential pathways, but here we observe whether the pathway
is active or not, which is what we emphasize.
19. In the Bayesian setting, we are not strictly speaking concerned with the frequentist conception of bias. However,
we are concerned with the correct interpretation of the parameters we estimate. Without conditioning on the proper
set of variables, the average marginal effect of λi we estimate will not represent solely the constraining effect of the
law, but may also include an effect of agreement with your own past self, whose views have been partially enshrined
in the law.
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path then runs from λ2 to y2 through y1 , φ1 , and φ2 .
This is a form of time-varying confounding, a particularly difficult issue for inference. Political
science has recently begun taking cues from biostatistics to deal with various forms of time-varying
confounding, such as using structural nested mean models (Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen 2016),
or marginal structural models (MSM) (Robins, Hernán, and Brumback 2000; Torres 2020) to
estimate controlled direct effects of past treatments when there are intervening treatments, or to
estimate cumulative effects of dynamic treatments with MSM (Blackwell 2013). However, while
these frameworks account for dynamic treatments, they do not account for dynamics where past
outcomes can affect current treatments.20
Sequential conditional mean models (Liang and Zeger 1986) are sometimes used with longitudinal data. These models are closer to our setting, where past outcomes, treatments, and confounders
can all have an effect on present treatment. However, the approach does not directly extend to
our setting, as the past outcomes’ effects on current treatments are actually a function of present
covariates, rather than an unconditional effect.
In our case, we can take advantage of the nature of λ as the prediction from a GP model to give
us a direct way to control for the effect of past values of y that have impacted λ. For case i,

λi =

i−1
X

k (xi , xt ) αt ,

(4.5)

t=1


α = ∇ log p Di−1 | λi−1 ,

(4.6)

where Di−1 and λi−1 indicate the decisions of the Court and the predicted legal outcomes in cases
before case i. Letting Yi be the set of indices of the justice’s y decisions that have been in the
majority up to case i, then
20. Additionally, the MSM framework is used for discrete treatment values rather than our continuous λ.
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ρi ,

X

k (xi , xt ) αt

(4.7)

t∈Yi

gives the total impact justice j’s preferences have had on λi . In other words, λi is a weighted sum,
and the elements of that sum attributable to justice j’s chosen outcomes are directly identifiable, so
we can control for them using that portion of the weighted sum. Thus, controlling for ρi blocks the
backdoor path from λi to yi through yi−1 and φi−1 , allowing us to obtain a correct estimate of the
effect of λ on y, assuming all other confounders on present decisions are accounted for.

4.3.4

Model specification

For the Court-level model, I use as predictors each of the case factors identified by prior literature
as relevant: the Category of restriction, the Actor imposing the restriction, the Restriction itself,
and the Identity of the speaker. I also use the Term of the Court as a predictor, to allow doctrine
to fluctuate over time. Finally, I include the Median Martin-Quinn Score on the Court to capture
any remaining ideological nature of these cases outside the dimensions of preference given by the
case factors. To ensure sufficient training data in the Court-level model, and sufficient observations
in the justice-level models, I use data before the appointment of Rehnquist as purely training data
and focus on the final natural court in the Rehnquist court—consisting of Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, O’Connor, Scalia, Souter, Stevens, and Thomas—for
analysis.21
I cannot optimize the prior in the Court-level model as a model-selection step or ρ would be
infected by other information in the prior optimization step, so I specify at the outset a somewhat
agnostic prior for the Court-level model. I use a scale factor of approximately 2.2, or the 90%
quantile of the logistic distribution. This corresponds to an assumption that on average, cases that
make it to the Supreme Court will have a probability of between 0.2 and 0.8 of having a liberal
21. For completeness I also conduct analysis on the other justices as well; the results in these other models are
substantively similar to those presented in the main paper and are reported in Appendix C.2.
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outcome; that is, we keep the model flexible enough to predict extreme outcomes but assume that
most cases that make it to the Supreme Court are not “easy cases”. For the length scales, I use a
length scale of one for each category of every case factor so that we are not a priori imposing a
relative importance of case factors but letting the model learn which case factors are more important
over time as we add data. Finally, for the Term and Median Martin-Quinn Score variables, I use
the inter quartile range for the length scale, which is about 24 and 0.11 respectively. This allows
the model to understand these variables are on a much larger and smaller scale respectively than
the others.
In the justice-level models, I use each of the case factors as predictors to capture the justice’s
own preferences, as well as the justice’s individual Martin-Quinn Score to capture any residual
ideological influence on their votes. Again, I include the Term to allow justices’ preferences to vary
over time. Finally, I include λ, or the predicted outcomes from the Court-level model, to represent
the law, and ρ to control for the justice’s own contribution to λ. As is standard for GP classification,
I first engage in a model-selection step to set the prior’s hyperparameters, then fit the justice-level
models to their individual voting records and calculate the average marginal effect γ as described in
Chapter 3. All analyses were conducted in R (R Core Team 2021) utilizing the R extension package
gpmss (Duck-Mayr 2021) for GP classification-specific functionality.

4.4

Results

The effect of λ is listed for each justice in Table 4.1 with 95% credible intervals.22 For interpretability, I calculated the effect on the probability scale, and as a discrete difference (also called
“first differences”) rather than marginal effect of instantaneous change. As choosing any particular
points at which to calculate the discrete difference is somewhat arbitrary, I report two different
choices of difference points: A change between the mean of λ minus one standard deviation and
22. Average marginal effects for all predictors are given in Appendix C.1
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the mean plus one standard deviation (−1.05 and 1.27, respectively), and a change between the
minimum and maximum values of λ (−2.42 and 3.09 respectively); both are common choices
for reporting first differences. The mean plus and minus a standard deviation also offers a nice
substantive interpretation: We are comparing a point at which we are fairly certain the law implies
a liberal ruling (λ = 1.27 corresponds to a 78% probability the ruling should be liberal according
to the Court’s past decisions) and a point at which we are fairly sure the law implies a conservative
ruling (λ = −1.05 corresponds to a 26% probability the ruling should be liberal according to the
law). So the effect tells us how much more likely a justice is to vote liberally in a case if the Court’s
past decisions imply a 78% probability the “correct legal outcome” in the case is liberal versus
a 26% probability it is liberal. This effect is averaged over all observations in the sample. For
example, the average marginal effect of λ for Justice Kennedy is 0.13 with a 95% credible interval
of [0.06, 0.22]. This means that for every set of case facts Kennedy was actually presented, on
average Kennedy’s probability of voting liberally would increase by 13% if past cases implied a
probability of 78% the correct legal outcome is liberal versus if past cases implied a probability of
26% the correct outcome is liberal. For the mean plus and minus a standard deviation, I also depict
the average marginal effect estimates in Figure 4.3 with 90% and 95% credible intervals.
We see that for most justices, the law exerts a reliable influence on their decision making; the
95% credible interval for Justices Breyer, Kennedy, O’Connor, Scalia, Stevens and Chief Justice
Rehnquist contains only positive values at both difference levels. However, for other justices,
the credible intervals bound zero, indicating the law does not have a reliable effect on their
decisions. Justices Souter and Thomas fall into this group. In some ways, this affirms past results
in the literature; some justices act relatively unconstrained as argued in Segal and Spaeth (2002).
However, contrast the closest analogous attitudinalist finding: Segal and Spaeth (1996) studied
dissenters to landmark cases and their subsequent votes in related cases. They found the justices
most deferential to the precedent they disagreed with still voted in line with their preferences (and
against the legal outcome) two thirds of the time, and for a supermajority of justices, that occurred
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Table 4.1: Average marginal effect of λ on judges’ decisions.

Breyer
Ginsburg
Kennedy
O’Connor
Rehnquist
Scalia
Souter
Stevens
Thomas

Mean of λ ± sd of λ

Range of λ

0.07
[0.01, 0.13]
−0.14
[−0.23, −0.05]
0.13
[0.06, 0.22]
0.08
[0.04, 0.13]
0.05
[0.00, 0.09]
0.10
[0.02, 0.17]
0.04
[−0.12, 0.21]
0.06
[0.02, 0.11]
0.02
[−0.06, 0.10]

0.18
[0.12, 0.25]
−0.29
[−0.39, −0.18]
0.31
[0.22, 0.39]
0.21
[0.16, 0.25]
0.12
[0.07, 0.16]
0.22
[0.13, 0.31]
0.11
[−0.07, 0.27]
0.16
[0.11, 0.20]
0.06
[−0.04, 0.15]

Note: For each justice, I report the estimate and 95%
confidence interval for the difference in the probability
the justice will vote liberally between two different values of λ, averaged over all observations in the sample.
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Breyer
Ginsburg
Kennedy
O'Connor
Rehnquist
Scalia
Souter
Stevens
Thomas
−0.2

−0.1
0.0
0.1
Marginal Effect of λ

0.2

Figure 4.3: Average marginal effect of λ on judges’ decisions. Estimates are depicted with
circles, 90% credible intervals are depicted with thick line segments, and 95% credible intervals
are depicted with thinner line segments. Effects are on the probability scale and calculated for
a concrete difference; they reflect the difference in the probability the justice will vote liberally
when the Court’s past decisions give a 0.78 probability the outcome should be liberal vs. a 0.26
probability the outcome should be liberal (corresponding to latent legal outcomes of 1.27 and -1.05
respectively—the mean of λ plus and minus one standard deviation).
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over 90% of the time. By contrast, here we see reliable evidence that the law on average affects the
decisions of a supermajority of the Court!23
Similarly, when we consider studies that do find some constraining effect of law, there are
important differences to the results here. First, and perhaps most importantly, past work in this area
has often been clouded by methodological issues, casting doubt on even the mixed evidence offered
in favor of legal constraint (see Lax and Rader 2010a). This study uses an approach that not only
handles error correlation over (e.g.) term,24 but crucially takes into account the “state dependence”
problem, or the problem that justices’ own preferences from the past get incorporated into the law
for the future. Without devising a control for the justices’ own influence on the current legal status
quo, any constraining effect of law found could be a spurious effect. An important limitation in
this approach is it requires us to identify the case factors relevant to judges’ preferences and court
outcomes. However, it allows us to control for this issue when we believe we have identified these
factors, and there is strong evidence in several contexts of the case factors we must include (see
Segal 1984; Richards and Kritzer 2002). By addressing the state dependence issue in contexts
where we can identify these factors, I offer the best available evidence to date of the constraining
effect of law.25
Next, there are contextual differences. For example, Bailey and Maltzman (2008) focus on
justices’ willingness to explicitly overrule precedent; while important to assess, this is decidedly a
narrower focus than the present study, which looks for the average influence the law has on justices’
decisions. Similar contextual differences separate the present study from past work (e.g. Black and
Owens 2009).
23. That is, a majority of the natural court studied.
24. As Carlson (2021) explains, GP models are a natural answer to the common methodological problem in political
science of violating an assumption of conditional independence.
25. A potential additional consideration in the Free Expression context is the ideological nature of the expression
in question. Epstein, Parker, and Segal (2018) show justices may provide more protection to speech they agree with
(for example, a conservative justice ruling to protect religious expression) than speech they disagree with (for example,
a liberal justice refusing protection to commercial speech). I include the variables from Epstein, Parker, and Segal
(2018) in the justice-level models in Appendix C.3, which gives substantively similar results.
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There are two crucial differences to Bartels (2009). First, the approach here allows for law to
influence justices differently; I allow Justice Breyer to consider the current state of the law more
important in his decision making than Justice Scalia does. In contrast, Bartels (2009) focuses on
an effect that is homogeneous across justices by construction. Moreover, Bartels (2009) treats the
case factors as relevant legal factors, but uses Martin-Quinn scores only to capture the justices’
preferences, while we would expect from theoretical approaches like the attitudinal model or the
case space model that we should in fact also treat justices’ issue-specific preferences as defined with
reference to the case factors. The modeling approach here allows us to capture both justice-level
preferences and legal implications with reference to the case factors.
The average marginal effect of law for Justice Ginsburg is reliably negative. This means that
as the Court’s past decisions indicate a higher probability that the correct legal outcome is liberal,
Justice Ginsburg becomes more likely to vote conservative. While it is possible there is some
unmeasured aspect of these cases that cause Justice Ginsburg’s preferred outcomes to differ from
the law, which could result in the negative marginal effect we see, it is also possible the mechanism
discussed in Section 4.2 is at play: Ginsburg may be affected by the law in cases where her vote is
not pivotal. As shown in Figure 4.4, that is indeed the case. The correlation between Ginsburg’s
latent outcomes and the latent legal outcome is 0.19 [-0.12, 0.47] when Ginsburg might be pivotal
(i.e., the correlation is not reliably negative), but is -0.32 [-0.50, -0.12] when Ginsburg is likely
not pivotal.26 This provides suggestive though not conclusive evidence that the mechanism from
Section 4.2 is driving the result for Ginsburg rather than omitted variable bias.
Another way to contextualize the effect of the law on justices’ decisions—and case outcomes—
is to determine how often a change in the legal status quo would cause a justice to change their
26. Notice that I use a pivotality threshold of six here, whereas strictly speaking a justice is only pivotal if the majority
coalition is five justices. Using the five justice threshold gives similar results: 0.44 [0.06, 0.71] and -0.32 [-0.48, -0.14]
respectively. However, I use the higher threshold to add observations to the pivotal group, to avoid concern that the
pattern was driven by too few observations in the pivotal group. This also serves to cover cases where Ginsburg is in
truth pivotal but her presence in the coalition causes another justice to join, or where Ginsburg has some uncertainty
about whether she would be pivotal.
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Figure 4.4: Comparing predicted outcomes for Justice Ginsburg against λ. Values are depicted with
gray circles. The right panel labeled “Pivotal” contains observations from all cases where Ginsburg
was part of a majority coalition of six or fewer justices—the situations where Ginsburg may have
been pivotal. The left panel labeled “Not Pivotal” contains observations from all remaining cases.
vote, and in turn how often the outcome in the case would change. For each vote cast by a justice,
I simulate whether their vote would switch from an anti-expression vote to a pro-expression vote
when λ moves from its mean minus its standard deviation (i.e., a situation where the legal status
quo says there is a 0.26 probability the legal outcome should be pro-expression) to its mean plus
its standard deviation (i.e., a situation where the legal status quo says there is a 0.78 probability
the legal outcome should be pro-expression). I generate 10,000 draws of whether a switch occurs
for each justice’s vote in each case to generate a credible interval for the proportion of their votes
that change. For each case, I also determine how often the outcome the Court would assign to the
case changed. The proportion of cases whose justice- and case-level outcomes would change are
presented in Figure 4.5. The effect of the law is substantial enough that over 11% of the cases the
Court heard would move from an anti-expression outcome to a pro-expression outcome with such
a change in the status quo.
Is the constraining effect of law here driven by situations in which doctrine allows little ideological discretion, while judges can follow their policy preferences more in less certain cases?
Bartels (2009) presents evidence that ideological constraint is higher in cases where more “certain”
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Figure 4.5: Proportion of justice- and case-level outcomes that would change from anti-expression
to pro-expression given a change in λ from -1.05 to 1.27 with 95% credible interval.
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legal tests such as the rational basis or strict scrutiny tests should apply than in cases where a more
fluid test such as intermediate scrutiny should apply. In the Free Expression context, this means
we should see a higher marginal effect of law in “Content based” restriction and “Less protected”
forms of expression cases than in “Content neutral” restriction cases. Figure 4.6 shows the marginal
effect of λ averaged over each case that each justice heard from each of those three categories.
While we do not see a difference in magnitude of the effect of law by category as Bartels
(2009) found, we see an effect in certainty; the credible intervals for the “Content based” and “Less
protected” categories are somewhat tighter than that for the “Content neutral” category. However,
this is likely simply caused by the fact that the “Content neutral” category has fewer cases in it, as
shown in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Number of observations in each category for each justice.
Justice
Breyer
Ginsburg
Kennedy
O’Connor
Rehnquist
Scalia
Souter
Stevens
Thomas

Less protected

Content neutral

Content based

35
36
53
73
145
58
37
120
42

19
19
25
27
42
26
19
36
21

71
75
107
125
188
114
70
171
80

So we can consider the more general formulation from Section 4.2: If justices only feel the
constraining effect of law when legal outcomes are more certain (thus giving them less ideological
discretion), the pointwise partial derivatives, giving the effect of law in each case, should be
increasing in |λ|. However, as shown in Figure 4.7, this is not the case, providing suggestive
evidence that for justices constrained by the law, they feel some internal constraint of the law, or in
other words, a preference for following the law that can conflict with—and perhaps in some cases
override—their sincere policy preferences.

80

Breyer

Ginsburg

Kennedy

O'Connor

Rehnquist

Scalia

Souter

Stevens

Thomas

0.3
0.0
−0.3

Marginal Effect of λ

−0.6

0.3
0.0
−0.3
−0.6

0.3
0.0
−0.3
−0.6

CB

CN

LP

CB

CN

LP

CB

CN

LP

Figure 4.6: Average marginal effect of λ by category. The effect displayed in this figure uses the
difference between minimum and maximum values of λ. Content based is abbreviated as CB,
Content neutral as CN, and Less protected as LP.
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Figure 4.7: Effect of λ by absolute value of λ for each justice. Pointwise effects depicted with light
gray crosses, LOESS smoother depicted with a black line, 95% CI for the smoother depicted with
gray shaded region.
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4.5

Conclusion

I asked at the outset, “(How much) does the law affect judges decisions?” The answer is the law
does affect judges decisions, substantially. . . at least some of them. Several studies approach the
question of legal influence on judicial decision making using contexts other than votes on the merits
and find the legal effects in decisions such as agenda-setting decisions (Black and Owens 2009),
citation choices (Hansford and Spriggs 2006; Hinkle 2015), or willingness to explicitly overrule
precedent (Bailey and Maltzman 2008). Bartels (2009) studies justices’ votes on the merits and
finds a constraining effect of law, but with an analysis that pools the justices together rather than an
analysis that allows some justices to be unfazed by the force of law.
I start from a general theoretical approach based on case space models (Lax 2011) and extended
it to consider the law as a potential explicit influence on judges’ preferred outcomes. Decision
makers in this model can consult the set of cases previously decided by the Court, comporting
with the typical model of legal reasoning (Levi 1949): we consider that like cases ought to be
treated alike, and determine the outcome reached in the most closely analogous cases to the one
we are deciding. This framework suggests a measure of the law: The predicted outcome in each
case given a model trained only on the cases that came before it. I use a model to generate these
predictions, GP classification (Rasmussen and Williams 2006), that accommodates realistic forms
of Court doctrine better than some more restrictive approaches to modeling doctrine taken in the
past (see Kastellec 2010). Importantly, this approach readily allows for a way to not only directly
test the average influence the law exerts on justices’ decisions, but crucially while controlling for
the justices’ own impact on the law—an issue of time-varying confounding that would otherwise
pose a danger to inference. With the effect of law thus carefully identified, I apply the method to
the natural court beginning with the appointment of Stephen Breyer and ending with the end of the
Rehnquist Court. I show several justices exhibit reliable constraint from the law in their decision
making, though others do not.
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This study makes several major contributions. First, I provide a fresh theoretical perspective on
legal constraint by conceptualizing the law as the implied outcome in each case given the cases that
came before it. Second, I present credible evidence of a substantial constraining effect of law for
some justices by addressing the danger to inference presented by the justices’ own votes affecting
the legal status quo whose effect we are trying to measure. Third, developing this measure of
the legal status quo in itself is a contribution; status quo policy is an important consideration in a
wide variety of political contexts. While, for example, Black and Owens (2009) simply uses the
median Martin-Quinn score of the lower court panel to measure the legal status quo, the measure
I develop provides the legal outcome implied by the Court’s past decisions, a quantity that is a
closer theoretical match to the concept of the legal status quo. I also provide suggestive evidence
differentiating between reasons why the law matters, indicating some justices have a preference for
following the law rather than seeing it as a constraint due to (for example) legitimacy needs, which
few studies have attempted. Finally, I highlight common mismatches between methods and theory
in studies of judicial politics: judges’ preferences within an issue area are best conceptualized as
multidimensional, and with respect to case facts; and empirical models seeking to capture either
the law or judges’ individual preferences with respect to case facts should be flexible enough to
accommodate any shape rather than imposing the strict assumption of linearity as in past studies.
Thus, I provide the most convincing evidence to date of a substantively important effect on judicial
decision making as well as provide methodological tools and measurement strategies useful for
future research in judicial politics.

84

Chapter 5
Conclusion
At base, the study of judicial politics is about determining how judicial behavior and/or institutions
affect the decisions and policy output of courts, and how existing law affects the choices judges
make. In this dissertation I tackle important aspects of both questions, and make advancements in
political methodology in the process.
I first examine how preference and judgment aggregation on collegial courts affects the consistency of legal doctrine. Using a social choice theoretical model, I show that because judges must
rely on abstraction to describe their preferred legal rules, only a very restrictive class of preferences for the judges can ensure consistency of legal doctrine from collegial courts. In addition to
its intrinsic substantive importance, this result also has important implications for other areas of
judicial politics, highlighting another area in which appellate court principals must balance control
over lower court agents with their other aims (such as consistency of doctrine) and new concerns
and avenues of research regarding predicting judges’ choices using facts of cases.
I also study the constraining effect of law at the US Supreme Court, which first requires some
methodological advancements. To identify the effect of law on the justices’ choices, I need both
(1) a measure of the legal status quo (i.e. what the outcome implied by the law is in the case before
the justices) and (2) a way to control for the information about the justices’ own preferences over
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outcomes that has leaked into the current state of the law because of their votes in past cases. As
explained by Kastellec (2010), models with strict functional form assumptions are inappropriate for
measuring legal rules, so I turn to a model from the machine learning literature: Gaussian process
(GP) classification.
Political scientists are beginning to make use of GP models (Duck-Mayr, Garnett, and Montgomery 2020; Carlson 2021; Gill 2021), but because these models hail from the machine learning
literature where the focus is on prediction rather than inference regarding predictors, I had to advance the state of the art for these models and derive the distribution of marginal effects of predictors
on outcomes. I thus present a chapter where a detailed primer on GP models is given for political
scientists, including practical guidance in their use for applied researchers and deriving inferential
quantities of interest for political scientists as well as providing a free, open-source, user-friendly R
package for these models, gpmss (Duck-Mayr 2021).
I use these tools in my investigation of the effect of legal constraint at the US Supreme Court.
I use GP classification to develop a measure of the legal status quo, which trains a model on
court-level outcomes from all previously decided cases and predicts out of sample for the case
before the justices in each case. I show how to exploit mathematical properties of this measure to
control for the information about justices’ preferences that has leaked into the measure of the legal
status quo, allowing me to more plausibly identify the causal effect of past precedent. I find the
law exerts a statistically reliable constraining effect on a supermajority of Supreme Court justices,
both a normatively important finding and one that informs our understanding and future study of
judicial behavior.
The work in this dissertation presents multiple avenues for future research. From a methodological standpoint, the technological innovations in Chapters 2 and 3 provide scaffolds for further
advancement. As mentioned in Chapter 2, study of the doctrinal dilemma from Kornhauser (1992)
I build on spread throughout the social choice literature (where it was known as the “discursive
dilemma” in more general contexts). The extension to multi-step reasoning could be explored
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further in future theoretical papers. Additionally, Gaussian process models are ripe for further extension for tasks useful for political scientists and other social scientists, such as estimating causal
effects via regression discontinuity designs (Ornstein and Duck-Mayr 2022).
Perhaps most importantly, the legal status quo measure developed in Chapter 4 will be useful for
a wide array of research questions in judicial politics. First, generating this measure in additional
issue areas to cover all the cases heard by the Supreme Court will result in a dataset useful for
the discipline at large. Additionally, there are specific substantive questions that dovetail with the
studies presented in this dissertation. For example, this approach can help bring a new perspective
and evidence to the study of legal change. Unlike past studies such as Richards and Kritzer (2002),
Bartels and O’Geen (2015) that look at when decision making at the Court changes, using this
measure of the legal status quo will allow me to explore when “the prophecies of what the courts
will do” (Holmes 1897) change. That is, the law shapes outside actors’ behavior by shaping their
expectations, so an important but less explored question regarding legal change is not when the
judges’ behavior in cases changes, but when our expectations about what they will do in cases
changes, which this measure will help illuminate.
This dissertation presents several implications for judicial politics. First, when collegial appellate courts craft legal rules, unless the appellate judges’ preferences over legal rules meet very strict
assumptions or they defer to lower courts’ findings on intermediate legal conclusions, inconsistent
legal doctrine may result. This has important normative implications, can affect courts’ efficacy
as policy makers, and exposes another aspect of the principal-agent problem in the judicial hierarchy. I also show that the most common approach in prior literature to empirically modelling the
relationship between case facts and outcomes is often inappropriate, and offer Gaussian process
classification as a solution. I also show how to use GP classification to generate a measure of
the legal status quo—what outcome would be implied in cases using only the information we
can derive from past cases alone—a concept that features prominently in many studies of judicial
politics. Finally, I provide the most reliable evidence to date on the extent to which past precedent
87

constrains the choices of US Supreme Court justices, a fundamental and long-running debate in
judicial politics.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1

Formal Results and Proofs

Proposition A.1. If all δj = δ ∗ , and δ ∗ is a balancing test, then ρm is a consistent rule. If δ ∗ is a
conjunctive or disjunctive test, ρm need not be a consistent rule.
Proof.
Balancing tests:
Suppose all δj = δ ∗ , a balancing test. Then when the collegial outcome is 1, dj must lie on
or beyond the hyperplane in D described by δ ∗ for every j in the majority coalition for any case
h. Then the point in D that is a dimension-by-dimension median for the majority coalition at h
must also lie on or beyond the hyperplane described by δ ∗ . Similarly, when the collegial outcome
is −1, dj must not lie as far as the hyperplane described by δ ∗ for any j in the majority coalition for
any case h, and therefore the point in D that is a dimension-by-dimension median for the majority
coalition at h must also not lie as far as the hyperplane described by δ ∗ . Therefore δm = δ ∗ and is
monotonic in fm .

Conjunctive and disjunctive tests:
[96]

For conjunctive tests, when the collegial outcome is 1, dij ≥ τi ∀ i for every j in the majority
coalition for any case h, and analogously for disjunctive tests and collegial outcomes of −1. Then
the point in D that is a dimension-by-dimension median for the majority coalition at h must also
satisfy that condition. However, when the collegial outcome is −1 for a conjunctive test, we can
only say ∃ i : dij ≤ τi rather than dij ≤ τi ∀ i. Then for each dimension i, there may be a member
of the majority coalition with a high enough placement of dij such that dim ≥ τi ∀ i even though
no member of the majority coalition would assign the outcome 1. (Again, an analogous argument
applies for disjunctive tests). Therefore δm may not be monotonic in fm .
Lemma A.1. If δj is monotonic in fj for every j ∈ J, then for every two cases h, h 0 ∈ H,
hk ≥ h 0k ∀ k implies that the collegial outcome at h is weakly greater than the collegial outcome
at h 0 .
Proof. If fj is monotonic and δj is monotonic in fj , then δj (fj ) is monotonic in H. Then the
collegial outcome set is monotonic in H by Proposition 3 from Lax (2007).
Proposition A.2. If δ is not a shared balancing test, F(δ) is nonempty.
Proof. If δ is not a shared balancing test, but every δj is monotonic, then by Lemma 1, the collegial
outcome set is monotonic in H. Then define two parallel hyperplanes in H, partitioning it into
three regions, such that cases in the least extreme region contain only cases with −1 outcomes,
cases in the most extreme region contain only cases with 1 outcomes, and cases in the “middle”
region contain cases with both outcomes (this third region is guaranteed to exist since δ is not
a shared balancing test). Then since N > n, a monotonic fact finding function fˆ can then be
constructed such that corresponding hyperplanes exist in D, where δm is monotonic in the most
and least extreme regions in D̂, but non-monotonicity is induced in the middle region.
Remark. The contrast between Lemma 1 and Proposition 2 may explain why legal scholars so
roundly critiqued Fourth Amendment doctrine although Segal (1984) found decisions well explained by historical facts. Segal (1984) was right that if you have enough observations (possibly
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a lot depending on the structure of H), a clear relationship can be found between H and outcomes.
However, because humans cannot generally think in such high dimensional spaces, a clear relationship between D and outcomes is what’s needed for clear doctrine; unfortunately Proposition 2
shows that even in general settings with well-behaved individual preferences, such a relationship
may not obtain.

A.2

Deference to Trial Court Findings

I refer to two types of facts, historical facts and doctrinal facts, the latter of which are sometimes
what legal texts may refer to as mixed questions of law and fact. A historical fact is what a lay
person may typically think of as a fact: whether or not an accused murderer’s victim is deceased,
whether or not a traffic light was green, etc. A doctrinal fact is a fact that requires some level of
legal analysis to determine: whether or not there was probable cause for a search, whether or not a
contract was formed, etc.
The model assumes the collegial appellate court determines for itself all the doctrinal facts.
When the doctrinal facts are questions of law, this is appropriate. When the doctrinal facts are
mixed questions, sometimes appellate courts give greater deference to trial courts’ findings, and
sometimes they review them de novo. What kinds of intermediate factual determinations do they
subject to greater scrutiny? Extant legal reasoning suggests the answer to this question perhaps
should be based on which “judicial actor is better positioned . . . to decide the issue in question.’ ’
Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985), at 114. For example, appellate and trial judges are equally
capable of examining the text of an unambiguous contract, while those present at trial are in a
better position to determine the credibility of witness testimony, having been present to observe
their demeanor. In Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996), quoted in the main text, the U.S.
Supreme Court settled a circuit split on whether findings of probable cause should be reviewed de
novo or with deference (in favor of de novo review).
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In addition to standard of review choices regarding mixed questions, appellate courts sometimes
apply a “constitutional fact doctrine’ ’ that could allow for independent review even of historical
facts (see, e.g., Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Borough of Ben Avon, 253 U.S. 287 (1920), allowing
de novo review of property valuation on appeal from state agency determinations). Some legal
scholars have criticized the evolution of this doctrine, worried it will be applied in inappropriate
situations (see, e.g., Hoffman 2001; Redish and Gohl 2017). The results here provide a formal
theoretic result to support such a concern.
Perhaps most troubling, heightened standards of review tend to be applied in cases regarding civil
liberties such as First and Fourth Amendment rights (Hoffman 2001; Redish and Gohl 2017). For
example, consider the determination in Ornelas to subject probable cause determinations to de novo
review. Similarly, some circuits hold that whether speech constitutes a “true threat’ ’ unprotected by
the First Amendment is a fact reviewable de novo, though other appellate courts disagree (Redish
and Gohl 2017, 292). Heightened review of facts is applied in many First Amendment contexts,
from cases involving freedom of speech to those implicating religious freedoms (Hoffman 2001,
1453–1455). The legal rules governing arguably our most important freedoms, for which there is
often disagreement such that the first sentence of Proposition 1 may not apply, may be the areas in
which courts most often apply increase scrutiny on findings of doctrinal facts.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1

Derivation of posterior over β in GP regression

In Gaussian process regression, we have the following model specification:

y ∼ N (f (X) + Xβ, σy2 I),

(B.1)

β ∼ N (b, B),

(B.2)

f ∼ GP(0, K(X)).

(B.3)

Suppose we want the posterior distribution of β. We find

p(β | y, X) ∝ p(y | β)p(β)
= N (y; Xβ, Ky ) × N (β; b, B),

where
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(B.4)
(B.5)

Ky = K(X) + σy2 I.

(B.6)

We can show

β | y ∼ N (β̄, Σβ ),

(B.7)

β̄ = (B −1 + X T Ky−1 X)−1 (B −1 b + X T Ky−1 y),
Σβ = (B −1 + X T Ky−1 X)−1

(B.8)
(B.9)

with a bit of tedious algebra:




1
T
−1
t −1
p(β | y, X) ∝ exp − (y − Xβ) Ky (y − Xβ) + (β − b) B (β − b)
2
 
1
= exp − y T Ky−1 y − β T X T Ky−1 y − y T Ky−1 Xβ + β T X T Ky−1 Xβ
2

T −1
T −1
T −1
T −1
+β B β−b B β−β B b+b B b
 
1
= exp − β T B −1 β + β T X T Ky−1 Xβ − β T B −1 b − β T X T Ky−1 y
2

T −1
T
−1
− b B β − y Ky Xβ


1 T −1
T −1
− y Ky y + b B b
2
 
1
= exp − β T (B −1 + X T Ky−1 X)β − β T (B −1 b + X T Ky−1 y)
2

T −1
T
−1
− (b B + y Ky X)β


1 T −1
T −1
− y Ky y + b B b
2
 
T
1
= exp −
β − (B −1 + X T Ky−1 X)−1 (B −1 b + X T Ky−1 y)
2
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(B.10)
(B.11)

(B.12)

(B.13)

(B.14)

× (B −1 + X T Ky−1 X)
−1

T

Ky−1 X)−1 (B −1 b

× β − (B + X


1 T −1
T −1
− y Ky y + b B b
2
 

T −1
1
∝ exp −
β − β̄ Σβ (β − β̄) ,
2

which is clearly the core of a normal distribution.
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+X

T

Ky−1 y)




(B.15)

B.2

Distribution of derivatives of Gaussian processes

Luckily, “[s]ince differentiation is a linear operator, the derivative of a Gaussian process is another
Gaussian process’ ’ (Rasmussen and Williams 2006, 191).
Let

∂ f1
∂ x 
 1d 
 . 
fd =  ..  .


 ∂ fn 
∂ xnd


(B.16)

Using Equation 9.1 in Rasmussen and Williams (2006),




∂ k (x1 , x1 )
∂ k (x1 , xn )
...
 ∂x

∂ x1d
1d




..
..
..
Kd , C [fd , f ] = 
,
.
.
.


 ∂ k (xn , x1 )
∂ k (xn , xn ) 
...
∂ xnd
∂ xnd

∂ 2 k (x1 , x1 )
∂ 2 k (x1 , xn )
...
 ∂x ∂x
∂ x1d ∂ xnd 
1d
1d




..
..
.
.
, C [fd , fd ] = 
,
.
.
.


2
2
 ∂ k (xn , x1 )
∂ k (xn , xn ) 
...
∂ xnd ∂ x1d
∂ xnd ∂ xnd

(B.17)



Kdd

(B.18)

To make the notation more compact, as is usual we set K = K (X, X), and additionally set
µ = µ and



∂ µ (x1 )
 ∂x 
1d 



..
µd = 
.
.


 ∂ µ (xn ) 
∂ xnd
Then we can describe the joint prior on f and fd :
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(B.19)


 
  
T
f 
 µ   K Kd 
 .
  ∼ N   , 
Kd Kdd
fd
µd

(B.20)

Then the posterior distribution of fd given X and y is normal with mean

Z
E [fd | X, y] =
Z
=

E [fd | f , X] p (f | X, y) df

(B.21)

µd + Kd K −1 (f − µ) p (f | X, y) df

(B.22)

= µd + Kd K −1 (E [f | X, y] − µ) ,

(B.23)

and variance (using the law of total variance)



V [fd | X, y] = Kdd − Kd K −1 KdT + E (E [fd | f ] − E [fd | X, y])2

(B.24)

= Kdd − Kd K −1 KdT
"
+E

µd + Kd K −1 (f − µ)

2 #

− µd + Kd K −1 (E [f | X, y] − µ)

(B.25)

= Kdd − Kd K −1 KdT
"
+E

2 #
Kd K −1 (f − µ) − Kd K −1 (E [f | X, y] − µ)

= Kdd − Kd K −1 KdT
"
+E

Kd K −1 f − Kd K −1 µ
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(B.26)

− Kd K

−1

E [f | X, y] + Kd K

= Kdd − Kd K

−1

KdT

= Kdd − Kd K

−1

KdT

"
+E

Kd K

−1

"
+ E Kd K

−1

−1

2 #
µ

f − Kd K

(B.27)
−1

2 #
E [f | X, y]
#

2


f − E [f | X, y]

(B.28)

K

−1

KdT

"

= Kdd − Kd K −1 KdT + Kd K −1 E

2 #
f − E [f | X, y]
K −1 KdT

(B.29)

= Kdd − Kd K −1 KdT + Kd K −1 V [f | X, y] K −1 KdT

= Kdd − Kd K −1 − K −1 V [f | X, y] K −1 KdT .

B.2.1

(B.30)
(B.31)
(B.32)

The regression case

In the regression case,

E [fd | X, y] = µd + Kd K −1 (E [f | X, y] − µ)
= µd + Kd K −1 µ + K Ky−1 (y − µ) − µ

= µd + Kd K −1 K Ky−1 (y − µ)

(B.33)


= µd + Kd Ky−1 (y − µ) ,

(B.34)
(B.35)
(B.36)

where, as usual, Ky = K + σy2 I. Then


V [fd | X, y] = Kdd − Kd K −1 − K −1 V [f | X, y] K −1 KdT


= Kdd − Kd K −1 − K −1 K − KKy−1 K K −1 KdT


= Kdd − Kd K −1 − I − Ky−1 K K −1 KdT
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(B.37)
(B.38)
(B.39)

= Kdd − Kd K −1 − K −1 − Ky−1



KdT

= Kdd − Kd Ky−1 KdT .

(B.40)
(B.41)

Note the similarity to the predictive distribution of f∗ for new cases X∗ .

B.2.2

The classification case

In the classification case, under the Laplace approximation to the posterior,

E [fd | X, y] = µd + Kd K −1 (E [f | X, y] − µ)





−1
= µd + K d K
µ + K ∇ log p y | f̂
−µ
 


= µd + Kd K −1 K ∇ log p y | f̂



= µd + Kd ∇ log p y | f̂ ,

V [fd | X, y] = Kdd − Kd K −1 − K −1 V [f | X, y] K −1 KdT

−1 −1  T
K
Kd
= Kdd − Kd K −1 − K −1 K −1 + W
= Kdd − Kd K + W −1


W = −∇∇ log p y | f̂ .

−1

KdT ,

(by the matrix inversion lemma)

(B.42)
(B.43)
(B.44)
(B.45)
(B.46)
(B.47)
(B.48)
(B.49)

[106]

B.3

Distribution of average marginal effects

Since then γd is a constant ( 1/N ) times the sum of correlated normal random variables,

γd ∼ N

N
N
N
1 X
1 XX
mγd i , 2
cγ ij
N i=1
N j=1 i=1 d

!
,

(B.50)

mγd = E [fd | X, y]

(B.51)

Cγd = V [fd | X, y]

(B.52)

Importantly, we may also get the average marginal effect of feature d within subgroups of X rather
than the full sample average by simply altering the indices of summation in Equation~B.50.
However, for binary classification, we may be more interested in the distribution of

πd ,

N
1 X ∂ σ (f (xi ))
N i
∂ xid

(B.53)

than γd . Unfortunately, that distribution cannot be analytically expressed, though we can readily
simulate from it. First note that
∂ σ (f (xi )) ∂ f (xi )
∂ σ (f (xi ))
=
.
∂ xid
∂f
∂ xid

(B.54)

Generally the sigmoid function σ has a known derivative; for example, in the logistic case,
∂ σ (f (xi ))
= σ (f (xi )) (1 − σ (f (xi ))) .
∂f

(B.55)

Since we have an approximation to the posterior on f , and given f , the posterior over fd is


fd | f ∼ N µd + Kd K −1 (f − µ) , Kdd − Kd K −1 KdT ,
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(B.56)

we can obtain M samples of πd by






• drawing f from N µ + K ∇ log p y | f̂
t



, (K

−1

−1

+ W)



,


• drawing fdt from N µd + Kd K −1 (f t − µ) , Kdd − Kd K −1 KdT ,
• and calculating πdt =

N
1 X ∂ σ (fit ) t
fid ,
N i=1 ∂ f

so that we can summarize the distribution of πd using the M draws, similar to the CLARIFY
procedure (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000).
Moreover, another issue to consider is discrete variables in X. For binary variables, let X∗1 be
a set of test points where all feature observactions are identical to X except that all observations
of feature d have been set to 1, and analogously for X∗0 .% 1 Then a more appropriate quantity of
interest rather than γd is

δd =

N
1 X
f (x∗1i ) − f (x∗0i ) ,
N i=1

(B.57)

which gives the average marginal effect on y of taking a 1 vs a 0 value in the regression case, or the
average partial effect on f of taking a 1 vs a 0 value in the classification case. Letting f1 = f (X∗1 )
and analogously for f0 , δd is distributed

δd ∼ N

N
N
N
1 XX
1 X
mδ i ,
cδ ij
N i=1 d N 2 j=1 i=1 d

!
,

(B.58)

mδd = E [f1∗ | X, y] − E [f0∗ | X, y] ,

(B.59)

Cδd = V [f1∗ | X, y] + V [f0∗ | X, y] + C [f1∗ , f0∗ | X, y] + C [f0∗ , f1∗ | X, y] .

(B.60)

For classification we can also simulate the distribution of
1. You can replace 1 and 0 with other binary value labels as needed.
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ψd =

N
1 X
σ (f (x∗1i )) − σ (f (x∗0i ))
N i=1

(B.61)

by simply generating values of f (X∗1 ) and f (X∗0 ) from the posterior approximation, pushing
those samples through the chosen sigmoid σ, and calculate the average of the differences to get
the average marginal effect for each sample so that we can summarize the distribution of average
marginal effects, similar to the continuous case. In the case of a categorical variable that has
been one-hot encoded into X, we can simply follow the above procedures for all the substantively
interesting pairwise comparisons between category labels. Moreover, in some cases using this
procedure to find the distribution of difference in MAP predictions at two discrete values of a
continuous variable may be more readily interpretable than πd .
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B.4

Derivatives of mean and covariance functions

Regarding the derivatives of the mean function,

µ (X) = 0 ⇒

µ (X) = Xβ ⇒

∂ µ (xi )
= 0,
∂ xid

(B.62)

∂ µ (xi )
= βd ,
∂ xid

(B.63)

to cover a couple of popular choices.
Note that calculating the mean and variance of the distribution of γd requires a twice-differentiable
covariance function. For the squared exponential covariance function with automatic relevance determination,

"
#!
X (xid − xjd )2
1
k (xi , xj ) = σf2 exp −
.
2 d
`2d

(B.64)

Then,

xjd − xid
∂ k (xi , xj )
= k (xi , xj )
∂ xid
`2d


∂ 2 k (xi , xj )
1
(xjd − xid ) (xid − xjd )
= k (xi , xj ) 2 +
,
∂ xid ∂ xjd
`d
`4d
Note that when i = j, the cross partial simplifies to σf2 /`2d .
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(B.65)
(B.66)

Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 4
C.1

Full results of main model

The main text of the paper presents results of the average marginal effect of λ, or the law. For those
interested in the average marginal effect of other predictors, I provide the average marginal effect
of every variable in the models in Table C.1. The average marginal effect here is on the link, or
latent, scale rather than on the probability scale; that is, it provides ∂x/∂f rather than ∂x/∂σ(f ).
Of note is that the results for λ are consonant with the probability scale results in the main paper,
with the exception that Justice Souter has a reliable positive average marginal effect of λ on the
latent scale even though the result is not reliable at a 95% level on the probability scale. Looking at
the marginal effects of other predictors, we see that most justices are more likely to vote liberally in
cases with content-based restrictions, which we may interpret as in line with the prior literature (see
Bartels 2009; Bartels and O’Geen 2015; Richards and Kritzer 2002). Other case factors appear
to have more nuanced effects, and may be highly conditional on the values of other variables. A
reader may also want to see breakdowns like Figure 4.4 between cases where a justice is pivotal or
not pivotal for justices other than Ginsburg; I provide such figures for each justice analyzed in the
main paper in Figure C.1.
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Table C.1: Average marginal effects for all predictors in the justice-level models.
Breyer
λ
ρ
Term
MQ Score

Ginsburg

Kennedy

O’Connor

Rehnquist

Scalia

Souter

Stevens

0.2
−0.5
0.8
0.2
0.2
0.3
1.1
0.2
[0.0, 0.4] [−0.9, −0.2] [0.6, 0.9]
[0.1, 0.3]
[0.0, 0.3]
[0.1, 0.5]
[0.1, 2.0]
[0.0, 0.3]
0.4
0.2
−0.6
0.0
−0.1
−0.4
−1.1
0.1
[0.2, 0.6]
[−0.3, 0.7] [−0.8, −0.4] [−0.1, 0.1] [−0.2, 0.0] [−0.5, −0.2] [−2.5, 0.2]
[0.0, 0.2]
0.0
−0.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
−0.1
0.0
[−0.3, 0.3] [−0.7, 0.5] [−2.4, 2.3] [−0.2, 0.2] [−0.2, 0.2] [−0.5, 0.5] [−22.8, 22.7] [−0.2, 0.2]
0.1
0.2
−2.8
−0.5
0.0
−0.1
0.4
0.1
[−0.1, 0.4] [−0.6, 1.0] [−4.2, −1.3] [−0.6, −0.3] [−0.2, 0.2] [−0.7, 0.4] [−8.3, 9.2] [−0.1, 0.3]

Thomas
0.1
[−0.1, 0.3]
−0.2
[−0.4, 0.0]
0.0
[−0.9, 0.9]
0.1
[−0.6, 0.8]

Category; reference ’Less Protected’;‘Content-based’ restriction abbreviated ‘CB’‘Content-neutral’ abbreviated ‘CN’
CB
CN

1.5
[1.1, 1.9]
1.1
[0.7, 1.6]

0.8
[0.5, 1.0]
0.1
[−0.2, 0.3]

0.9
[0.5, 1.2]
−0.2
[−0.5, 0.2]

1.3
−1.1
−0.1
[0.6, 2.0] [−14.2, 12.1] [−0.4, 0.2]
−0.6
−1.0
−0.2
[−1.4, 0.3] [−14.4, 12.3] [−0.5, 0.1]

−0.1
−2.2
0.0
[−1.3, 1.2] [−4.1, −0.3] [−0.3, 0.2]
−0.5
−1.2
0.8
[−1.6, 0.7] [−2.9, 0.4]
[0.5, 1.0]
−0.2
−0.6
0.3
[−1.4, 1.1] [−2.3, 1.2]
[0.0, 0.6]
0.0
−1.8
−0.1
[−1.2, 1.3] [−3.6, 0.1] [−0.4, 0.2]
−0.8
1.4
0.3
[−2.0, 0.4] [−0.3, 3.1]
[0.0, 0.6]

0.5
[0.1, 0.9]
0.8
[0.4, 1.1]
−0.4
[−0.8, 0.0]
−0.2
[−0.6, 0.2]
0.3
[−0.1, 0.6]

−0.3
[−1.1, 0.6]
1.1
[0.3, 1.9]
−0.4
[−1.3, 0.5]
0.3
[−0.6, 1.2]
0.7
[−0.2, 1.5]

0.0
[−0.4, 0.4]
−0.7
[−1.1, −0.4]
0.2
[−0.1, 0.6]
−0.3
[−0.7, 0.1]
−0.4
[−0.8, −0.1]
0.0
[−0.4, 0.3]

0.5
[−0.4, 1.3]
−1.8
[−2.8, −0.9]
0.5
[−0.3, 1.3]
−0.5
[−1.5, 0.4]
−1.3
[−2.2, −0.3]
−0.9
[−1.9, 0.0]

1.7
[0.7, 2.7]
1.1
[0.0, 2.2]

4.1
[2.6, 5.6]
−0.8
[−2.6, 0.9]

1.9
[1.1, 2.7]
0.1
[−0.8, 1.0]

Government; reference ‘Other’
Education
Federal
Local
Private
State

−0.1
[−0.6, 0.3]
−0.1
[−0.5, 0.4]
0.0
[−0.5, 0.5]
0.1
[−0.4, 0.6]
−0.6
[−1.1, −0.1]

1.2
[−14.3, 16.6]
−2.8
[−17.4, 11.8]
−0.6
[−16.8, 15.6]
−1.6
[−17.6, 14.5]
−4.8
[−19.3, 9.6]

0.0
−0.3
[−0.3, 0.3] [−1.3, 0.8]
−0.5
2.2
[−0.8, −0.2] [1.2, 3.1]
0.1
−0.6
[−0.2, 0.4] [−1.6, 0.4]
−0.3
0.0
[−0.7, 0.0] [−1.0, 1.1]
−0.1
1.3
[−0.4, 0.2]
[0.3, 2.2]

Action; reference ‘Civil suit’
0.1
[−0.3, 0.6]
−0.3
[−0.8, 0.1]
Censor
−1.2
[−1.6, −0.7]
Disciplinary
−0.7
[−1.1, −0.2]
Lose job
−0.5
[−0.9, 0.0]
Regulation
−0.6
[−1.1, −0.2]

Criminal

Deny benefit

−0.5
[−1.9, 0.8]
−0.2
[−1.6, 1.2]
−1.6
[−2.8, −0.4]
−1.0
[−2.4, 0.4]
−1.1
[−2.6, 0.3]
−1.1
[−2.4, 0.3]

1.2
0.2
[−0.7, 3.1] [−0.1, 0.4]
−1.1
−0.5
[−3.1, 1.0] [−0.7, −0.2]
1.7
0.2
[−0.2, 3.5]
[0.0, 0.5]
0.8
−0.1
[−1.3, 2.8] [−0.4, 0.1]
−1.2
−0.6
[−3.3, 0.9] [−0.9, −0.3]
−0.7
−1.0
[−2.7, 1.3] [−1.2, −0.7]

−0.4
1.1
[−14.5, 13.6] [0.7, 1.4]
−4.7
0.1
[−19.7, 10.3] [−0.2, 0.4]
−5.6
0.5
[−19.7, 8.6]
[0.2, 0.8]
−4.0
0.9
[−19.0, 11.1] [0.6, 1.2]
−2.0
0.8
[−16.5, 12.6] [0.4, 1.1]
−1.6
0.3
[−15.6, 12.4] [0.0, 0.6]

0.9
[−0.1, 1.9]
0.0
[−1.1, 1.0]
2.3
[1.4, 3.2]
1.3
[0.3, 2.3]
−0.4
[−1.4, 0.6]
0.3
[−0.7, 1.3]

Speaker identity; reference ‘Other’
Communist
Broadcast
Business
Protester
Politician
Print
Religious

−0.3
0.4
−3.2
[−0.8, 0.1] [−0.7, 1.5] [−4.9, −1.4]
−1.2
−0.4
2.9
[−1.7, −0.8] [−1.5, 0.6]
[1.4, 4.5]
0.6
−0.8
[−0.5, 1.7] [−2.5, 1.0]
−0.3
0.7
−3.7
[−0.7, 0.2] [−0.3, 1.8] [−5.3, −2.0]
−2.3
[−4.1, −0.6]
−0.3
1.2
−1.5
[−0.8, 0.1]
[0.0, 2.3]
[−3.2, 0.2]

0.6
[0.3, 0.9]
1.0
[0.7, 1.3]
0.8
[0.5, 1.0]
0.7
[0.4, 1.0]
1.0
[0.8, 1.3]
0.7
[0.5, 1.0]
1.0
[0.7, 1.2]

0.7
[0.3, 1.0]
1.1
[0.7, 1.4]
0.9
[0.6, 1.3]
0.5
[0.1, 0.8]
0.8
[0.4, 1.1]
0.3
[−0.1, 0.7]
0.7
[0.3, 1.1]

0.7
[−0.1, 1.5]
2.0
[1.2, 2.7]
0.9
[0.1, 1.7]
−0.1
[−0.9, 0.7]
0.5
[−0.3, 1.3]
0.9
[0.1, 1.7]

−1.3
[−17.3, 14.7]
0.9
[−12.0, 13.8]
2.7
[−12.7, 18.0]
4.0
[−10.9, 18.8]
1.0
[−14.8, 16.8]
6.2
[−7.9, 20.2]

−0.1
[−0.4, 0.2]
−0.1
0.7
[−0.4, 0.2] [−0.2, 1.6]
−0.2
2.3
[−0.5, 0.1]
[1.5, 3.2]
0.1
1.1
[−0.2, 0.4]
[0.2, 2.0]
0.0
−1.0
[−0.3, 0.3] [−1.9, −0.1]
−0.1
[−0.4, 0.2]
0.4
0.5
[0.1, 0.7]
[−0.4, 1.4]

Note: For each justice, I report the estimate and 95% confidence interval for the average marginal effect on the link scale. For the continuous variables ‘MQ Score’,
‘Term’, ‘λ’, and ‘ρ’, this is the instantaneous rate of change. For the categorical variables ‘Category’, ‘Government’, ‘Action’, and ‘Speaker Identity’, this is a discrete
difference against a reference category (listed in the table).
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Figure C.1: Comparing predicted outcomes for each justice against λ.
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C.2

Marginal effect of law for additional justices

In the main paper I focus on results for the last natural court of the Rehnquist court to ensure that
1. a sufficient number of observations are used as purely training data for the court-level model
to ensure the quality of the λ measure used in the justice-level models;
2. we are using every case decided by each justice we’re analyzing; and
3. we have a sufficient number of observations for each justice we’re analyzing to ensure the
quality of estimates.
In this appendix I provide supplemental results for additional justices. However, I do not analyze
the Trump appointees, who each have observations in the single digits in this data. Additionally,
even the Bush and Obama appointees all have less than 50 observations, so we may want to see more
data from them as well (all justices whose results are presented in the main paper have over 100
observations), since GP classification can be a somewhat data-hungry procedure (see Duck-Mayr,
Garnett, and Montgomery 2020). The number of observations in the data for each justice is given
in Table C.2.
I present the average marginal effect of λ for the justices who decided any cases outside of the
training data that were not presented in the main paper (except for the Trump appointees) in Table
C.3. These results are substantively similar to the results for the natural court studied in the main
paper, with a majority of justices exhibiting a reliably positive average marginal effect of law, while
others are more or less unconstrained.
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Table C.2: Number of complete observations for each justice.
Justice
Kavanaugh
Gorsuch
Kagan
Sotomayor
Alito
Roberts
Douglas
Breyer
Souter
Ginsburg
Thomas
Stewart
Kennedy
Scalia
Powell
Burger
O’Connor
Brennan
Marshall
Blackmun
White
Stevens
Rehnquist
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N
6
8
25
31
46
49
67
125
126
130
143
156
185
198
218
219
225
262
279
302
302
327
375

Table C.3: Average marginal effect of λ on judges’ decisions.

Alito
Blackmun
Brennan
Burger
Douglas
Kagan
Marshall
Powell
Roberts
Sotomayor
Stewart
White

Mean of λ ± sd of λ

Range of λ

−0.03
[−0.15, 0.07]
0.12
[0.10, 0.15]
0.02
[−0.08, 0.12]
0.11
[0.09, 0.14]
0.11
[−0.05, 0.29]
−0.50
[−0.55, −0.45]
0.02
[−0.10, 0.13]
0.26
[0.23, 0.30]
−0.28
[−0.29, −0.26]
0.27
[0.25, 0.29]
0.11
[0.07, 0.16]
0.13
[0.08, 0.18]

−0.08
[−0.21, 0.04]
0.29
[0.26, 0.31]
0.04
[−0.06, 0.15]
0.27
[0.25, 0.29]
0.25
[0.08, 0.44]
−0.94
[−0.95, −0.92]
0.05
[−0.07, 0.16]
0.58
[0.55, 0.61]
−0.57
[−0.59, −0.56]
0.57
[0.55, 0.58]
0.26
[0.21, 0.30]
0.30
[0.25, 0.35]

Note: For each justice, I report the estimate and 95%
confidence interval for the difference in the probability
the justice will vote liberally between two different values of λ, averaged over all observations in the sample.
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C.3

Robustness check: In-group bias

Epstein, Parker, and Segal (2018) find that justices may offer greater protection to speech they
agree with. We may worry this feeds into φ and thus may bias the γ estimate unless we control for
whether the speech at issue is liberal or conservative. I re-run the analysis with a variable coding
whether the speech at issue in a case is liberal (for example, obscenity), conservative (for example,
commercial or religious speech), or neutral (such as where, for example, campaign spending of
both Republicans and Democrats is implicated), as well as other variables from Epstein, Parker,
and Segal (2018) such as whether the law at issue is conservative (e.g. anti-obscenity laws), liberal
(e.g. a law criminalizing depiction of animal cruelty), or neutral, whether the challenge is an “as
applied” or “facial” challenge, and the type of expression (spoken, written, other expression, or
association) at issue. As the Epstein, Parker, and Segal (2018) data covers the 1953-2014 terms, I
update and backdate that data, as well as filling in some missingness from cases that were included
in the Richards and Kritzer (2002) data but not in the Epstein, Parker, and Segal (2018) data.
The results are largely substantively similar. The main differences to note are that our estimate
of the average marginal effect of law for Kennedy is now essentially zero and not reliably positive or
negative, and the result for Rehnquist is weakened. However, a majority of the Court still exhibits
a reliable effect of the law on their decision making.
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Table C.4: Average marginal effect of λ on judges’ decisions.

Breyer
Ginsburg
Kennedy
O’Connor
Rehnquist
Scalia
Souter
Stevens
Thomas

Mean of λ ± sd of λ

Range of λ

0.04
[−0.01, 0.10]
−0.15
[−0.22, −0.09]
0.00
[−0.10, 0.11]
0.05
[0.01, 0.08]
0.02
[−0.03, 0.06]
0.04
[−0.03, 0.11]
0.12
[0.04, 0.20]
0.05
[0.00, 0.10]
−0.08
[−0.16, 0.01]

0.10
[0.05, 0.16]
−0.34
[−0.41, −0.27]
0.00
[−0.11, 0.12]
0.12
[0.08, 0.16]
0.02
[−0.02, 0.07]
0.10
[0.01, 0.18]
0.28
[0.19, 0.37]
0.12
[0.07, 0.18]
−0.18
[−0.27, −0.09]

Note: For each justice, I report the estimate and 95%
confidence interval for the difference in the probability
the justice will vote liberally between two different values of λ, averaged over all observations in the sample.
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